The Confluence of Bulk Transfer and Fraudulent Disposition Law by Alces, Peter A.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1990
The Confluence of Bulk Transfer and Fraudulent
Disposition Law
Peter A. Alces
William & Mary Law School, paalce@wm.edu
Copyright c 1990 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Alces, Peter A., "The Confluence of Bulk Transfer and Fraudulent Disposition Law" (1990). Faculty Publications. Paper 297.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/297
THE CONFLUENCE OF BULK TRANSFER AND 
FRAUDULENT DISPOSITION LAW 
Peter A. Alces* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
l. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 
ll. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 
A. The "Bulk Sales Risk" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 
B. Early Nonuniform Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 
C. Affinity Between Fraudulent Disposition Law 
and Bulk Sales Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 
1. Prejudice to Unsecured Creditors . . . . . . . . . 837 
2. Conceptions of Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 
D. The Incongruities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 
1. Personal Property Security........ . ...... 845 
a. Secured Transactions Excepted from 
the Scope of Article 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 
b. Judicial Hostility Toward Exceptions . 849 
2. Leveraged Business Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . 852 
a. Contract Bargain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 
b. Property Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 
c. Tort Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 
3. Constructive and Actual Fraud 
Distinguished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 
a. The Distinction Blurred: UFT A . . . . . . 860 
b. United States v. Tabor Court Realty 
Corp................................ 861 
c. Characterization of the Bulk Sale: LBO 
Parallels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 
III. THE BRAVE NEw WoRLD . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 
A. A World Without Uniform Bulk Sales Law . . . 865 
* Professor of Law and John S. Stone Faculty Fellow, University of Alabama School of 
Law. 
821 
822 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 41:3:821 
B. A World With Revised Article 6.............. 867 
IV. CoNCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Fraud law, as nature, abhors a vacuum. Where gaps in the 
statutory or common law admit inequity, pervasive fraud princi-
ples intervene to redress the imbalance. The two bulk sales 
alternatives promulgated by the American Law Institute1 (ALI) 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws2 (NCCUSL) provoke rethinking of the balance of equities 
vouchsafed by commercial fraud law in the bulk sales context. In 
light of the fact that the initiatives follow so closely upon the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),3 also promulgated by the 
NCCUSL;' it is appropriate to appraise the fit between the UFTA 
and bulk sales law that would result from enactment of either of 
the alternatives. 
Just as for every action there is an equal and opposite reac-
tion, for every enactment that impacts the application of fraud 
principles in commercial law, the existing statutory and common 
law responds. In the more colloquial language of the lawyer, hard 
cases will make bad law no matter how good the law may otherwise 
be. The challenge, then, is to anticipate the consequences of enact-
ing a law, albeit a better law, and to take those consequences into 
account when formulating the contours of the new enactment. 
1. The American Law Institute began in 1921 as a project proposed by the Association 
of American Law Schools. The ALI was envisioned as a "juristic centre for the betterment 
of the law," and "its first major undertaking should be to prepare a 'Restatement of the 
Law.'" W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 273-74 (1973). See gcn· 
erally Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 283; Lewis, 
History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the Law, RESTATE· 
MENT IN THE COURTS 1 (perm. ed. 1945). 
In 1985, the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws appointed a drafting committee to revise Article 6. The ALI approved the final draft 
of revised Article 6 in May 1989. 
2. The NCCUSL was formed in 1892 and is comprised of unpaid commissioners ap-
pointed by state governors. It primarily prepares acts in commercial law for possible 
adoption by state legislatures. W. TwiNING, supra note 1, at 272. See also Durhnn, A History 
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 233 (1965). 
3. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Ar:r (UFTA), 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984). 
4. The UFTA was approved by the NCCUSL in 1984. 
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To the extent that the alternatives endeavor to limit or wholly 
abrogate offensive commercial law fraud theories, plaintiffs' coun-
sel will likely seek other ways to realize the results now assured 
through successful prosecution of a bulk transfer action under orig-
inal Article 6. Old habits, particularly those that prove lucrative, 
die hard. The viability of the alternatives must be appraised not 
only through consideration of the changes they occasion but also 
through consideration of the least anticipated and perhaps even 
least "commercial'' ramifications. While we can hope for the best, 
it is not an unhealthy state of mind at this juncture to anticipate 
the worst. 
There are, however, difficulties that attend such an evaluation. 
To a degree it is the problem of hitting not one but two targets of 
indeterminate scope. First, perhaps the most troubling shortcom-
ing of original Article 6 is that its provisions lend themselves to 
inconsistent and often incongruous constructions of fundamental 
matters. For example, the most litigated issues under Article 6 
concern the scope of the law.~ Equally troublesome is the Article's 
failure to establish sanctions for noncompliance with its provi-
sions,6 and its incomplete delineation of proper plaintiffs and 
defendants.7 While case law has responded to the dearth of guid-
5. Chancellor Hawkland has observed that: 
[o]f sixty reported cases arising under Article 6, thirty-two involve Section 6-102. The 
fact that more than one-half of all the bulk transfer cases are concerned with this 
section is ... not surprising, because where there has been no compliance with the 
requirements of the bulk transfer law the transferee often will argue that the law does 
not govern the transaction at hand because it is not a 11bulk transfer" within the 
definition of section 6-102. 
Hawkland, The Trouble with Article 6 of the U.C.C.: Some Thoughts About Section 6-102, 
81 Col\t L.J. 83, 83-84 (1976). 
6. See J. WHITE & R SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 907-09 (3d ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing confusion over meaning of Article 6 term "ineffective"); See generally P. ALCES. THE 
LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 11 4.04(4) (1989). 
7. For cases considering proper plaintiff issues, see United States v. Vertac Chem. 
Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (state and 
federal agencies with environmental liens are entitled to protections of Article 6); Chemical 
Bank v. Society Brand Indus., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (bank, as tort creditor, 
was entitled to notice of bulk transfer and its failure to receive notice gave it standing to 
attack transfer as ineffective); Brown v. Superior Pontiac-GMC, 352 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1977) (Article 6 was not promulgated to protect interests of stockholder dissenting 
from sale of corporation's assets and having a claim for redemption, but only those of trade 
creditors). 
For cases evidencing the confusion over the liability of a defendant-transferee, compare 
Get It Kwik of Am., Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 361 So. 2d 568 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (legislature 
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ance, ad hoc resolution of recurring and crucial issues is inimical to 
the commercial law's interest in certainty, predictability, and sta-
bility.8 Second, we do not, as yet, know how revised Article 6 will 
resolve troublesome issues as they arise in real controversies.9 Fi-
nally, fraud principles are necessarily amorphous.1° Fraud is easy 
to interpose and often more difficult to disprove than to prove. 
The drafters of bulk sales law, a species of fraud law, must come to 
did not intend to impose personal liability on transferee) and American Express Co. v. Bo· 
mar Shoe Co., 125 Ga. App. 408, 187 S.E.2d 922 (1972) (Article 6 was not intended to 
impose personal liability on transferee) with McKesson Robbins v. Bruno's, Inc., 368 So. 2d 
1 (Ala. 1979) (transferor's creditors may proceed against transferee) and Johnson v. Vincent 
Brass & Aluminum Co., 244 Ga. 412, 260 S.E.2d 325 (1979) (omitted creditor of whom trans· 
feree had knowledge could proceed against transferee). 
8. See generally Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 291. Hawkland asserts that "the commercial law grew along lines which produced 
gaps and uncertainties in spite of volumes of cases. Indeed, gaps and uncertainties seem to 
have been generated in direct proportion to the number of published opinions." Id. at 296. 
As a result, "[t)he commercial community has made a modest demand on the law to give it 
rules which will operate evenly and with a fair degree of predictability." Jd. at 320. 
See also U.C.C. § 1-102 (1987): 
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
9. For that matter, it is not even clear how the revision would resolve the perceived 
fundamental incongruity under the current law. The prefatory note to revised Article 6 ob-
serves that: 
Article 6 (1987 Official Text} is remarkable in that it obligates buyers in bulk to incur 
costs to protect the interests of the seller's creditors, with whom they usually have no 
relationship ... . The Article thereby impedes normal business transactions, many of 
which can be expected to benefit the seller's creditors. For this reason, Article 6 has 
been subjected to serious criticism. 
U.C.C. Article 6 prefatory note (1988) (citing Rapson, U.C.C. Article 6: Should It Be Re· 
uised or "Deep-Sixed''? 38 Bus. LAW. 1753 (1983)). 
10. An early commentator noted that: 
[a]s to relief against frauds no invariable rules can be established. Fraud is infinite: 
and were a Court of Equity once to lay down rules how far they would go, and no 
farther, in extending their relief against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence 
of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes, 
which the fertility of man's invention would contrive. 
Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaimes (June 30, 1759) (quoted in 1 J. STORY, CoM-
MENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 186 
(1836)). 
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terms with both the body of fraud principles generally and the par-
ticular place that bulk sales law occupies in commercial fraud law. 
This Article endeavors to describe the status quo, offer a con-
struction of the proposed alternatives, and posit a frame of 
reference to inform enactment and application of the new law. The 
discussion first treats the development of the bulk sales problem, 
traces both the uniform and nonuniform responses to it, and ana-
lyzes the relationship between bulk sales law and other aspects of 
commercial fraud jurisprudence. A perspective is then advanced 
that juxtaposes the results intended by enactment of the alterna-
tives and the anticipated reality. 
II. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED 
To understand the current bulk sales enactment and to estab-
lish the role of bulk sales law in the commercial fraud landscape, it 
is necessary to track the development of commercial fraud rules 
generally and in the bulk sales setting particularly. This section 
will review the evolution of commercial fraud and bulk sales prin-
ciples, stressing the affinity between the fraud concepts that drive 
uniform fraudulent disposition law (i.e., those formulated in the 
UFTA),11 sections 54712 and 54813 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978,14 and bulk sales law. The incongruities among the various 
commercial fraud enactments will then appear in sufficient relief to 
support reliable conclusions regarding deficiencies in the proposed 
alternatives. 
11. See generally Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 527; Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 
U.C.C. L.J. 195 (1986). 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988 & Supp. 1989). This is the preference provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
13. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp 1989). One of the considerations in drafting the 
UITA was to bring state law into accord with section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. U.F.T .A. 
prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984). For a discussion of the similarities and differences 
between the UITA and section 548, seeP. ALcES, supra note 6 at 1l 5.02[3); Kennedy, supra 
note 11 at 208-09. 
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
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A. The "Bulk Sales Risk" 
One of the earliest bulk sales statutes was enacted in Louisi-
ana in the late nineteenth century. It was a part of the state's 
criminal law and proscribed the purchase of "goods, wares, mer-
chandise, or other commodity" under circumstances that would 
effect a fraud on the seller .1G That statute, and others like it 
promulgated around the time of the "Great Depression," were uti-
lized by creditors of sellers who sold all of their stock in 
merchandise and absconded with the proceeds to parts unknown, 
or at least parts beyond the jurisdictional reach of the state's 
courts.16 
In the absence of bulk sales legislation, creditors of the trans-
feror could only reach assets in the hands of the transferee-bulk 
buyer by utilizing statutory fraudulent conveyance law, or com-
mon-law fraudulent conveyance principles based on the Statute of 
13 Elizabeth.17 In order to avoid the transfer to the buyer and ex-
pose the transferred assets to the claims of the seller's creditors, a 
court had to find that the buyer in some way had been party to the 
fraud effected by the seller. The insidious state of mind of a buyer 
who paid sufficient value for the assets was difficult to establish.18 
15. 1894 La. Acts 166. Section 1 of the Louisiana Act provided that whoever pur-
chased "goods, wares, merchandise or other commodity under an assumed or fictitious name 
and with intent to cheat or defraud the seller or vendor" was guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Section 2 provided that whoever purchased "goods, merchandise, wares or other commodity 
on credit and shall sell, hypothecate, or dispose of the same out of the usual course of busi-
ness and with the intent to cheat or defraud the seller or vendor, shall be deemed guilty of n 
misdemeanor." Section 3 of the Act provided that "whosoever shall purchase any goods, 
wares, or merchandise, or other commodity on credit and shall secrete himself, or abscond 
from the State for the purpose, and with the intent, of cheating or defrauding tho seller or 
vendor, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." 
16. A 1928 law review article described a typical bulk sale as follows: 
Joseph Johnson operates a men's clothing store in a rented storeroom along Mar-
ket Street in the town of X. He has a stock of goods valued in his property statement 
at $3,000. Harry Jackson, credit manager for the T supply house, extends Johnson 
credit and fills his orders up to $1,000. Ten days after these goods have been deliv-
ered, Jackson learns that Johnson has sold out his business "lock, stock, and barrel" 
to Fred Brown for $2,000, has invested the money in an automobile, and has loft in 
the car for an undisclosed destination. An investigation reveals that Johnson has no 
other assets than the automobile, and that, at the time of the transfer of the stock of 
goods, Johnson gave Brown positive assurance that the business was free from debt. 
Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 72, 72 (1928). 
17. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). 
18. Courts construing pre-statutory fraudulent transfer law went to some lengths to 
find insidious intent on the part of the buyer of the assets. See, e.g., Manwaring v. O'Brien, 
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Of course, if the buyer paid an insufficient consideration, the trans-
fer was avoidable on that basis as a gift. 19 
Twyne's Case,20 the (in)famous decision establishing the req-
uisite "badges of fraud," was the starting point for any fraudulent 
conveyance action, and that would also have been true in the case 
of a bulk sale attacked as a fraudulent conveyance. The case iden-
tified six such badges: 
1st. That this gift had the signs and marks of fraud, because the 
gift is general, without exception of his apparel, or any thing of ne-
cessity; for it is commonly said, quod dolus versatur in generalibus. 
2nd. The donor continued in possession, and used them as his 
own; and by reason thereof he traded and trafficked with others, and 
defrauded and deceived them. 
3rd. It was made in secret, et dona clandestina sunt semper 
suspz.cwsa. 
4th. It was made pending the writ. 
5th. Here was a trust between the parties, for the donor pos-
sessed all, and used them as his proper goods, and fraud is always 
apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is a cover of fraud. 
6th. The deed contains, that the gift was made honestly, truly 
and bona fide; et clausae inconsuet' semper inducunt 
suspicionem. 21 
If the prototypical bulk sale is examined in terms of those badges 
of fraud, the similarities and differences between bulk sales and 
fraudulent conveyance law become clear. 
First, a bulk sale is not a "gift"; the seller receives a reasona-
bly equivalent value in exchange for the transfer of assets. So the 
language of the first badge initially appears inapposite. However, 
75 Minn. 542, 545, 78 N.W. 1, 2 (1899) ("Where the vendee has knowledge of such facts as 
would lead the ordinarily prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make inquiries, whereby 
the fraudulent intent would have been discovered, he cannot be deemed a bonn fide pur-
chaser of property."); St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. Steimke, 68 Mo. App. 52, 56 (1896) ("Facts 
which might be considered by •.. the jury as badges of fraud [include) undue and unusual 
haste in the transaction of purchase; ... the purchase of the contents of n store in lump 
without ... any satisfactory explanation why the goods were neither inventoried nor np· 
praised [and] gross inadequacy in price."); Beels v. Flynn, 28 Neb. 574, 581, 44 N.\\'. 732, 
733 (1890) ("Purchaser cannot close his eyes to the circumstances under which n debtor sells 
his goods . . . [and if] he buys at a considerable discount. nnd the effect of the proposed 
means of payment must be to hinder and delay, if not defraud creditors of the seller, the 
purchaser will buy at his peril."). See generally, Billig, supra note 16 at 76-81. 
19. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 268·69 (re\'. ed. 1940). 
20. 3 Coke Rep. SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). 
21. Twyne's Case, 3 Coke Rep. at 80b-81a, 76 Eng. Rep. nt 812-14 (footnotes omitted). 
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even though it is not gratuitous, it is "general." That is, it divests 
the seller of all or at least a majority of the seller's merchandise, 
the assets which bulk sales law monitors. So far as the seller's cred-
itors are concerned, a transfer of a majority of the seller's assets 
gives rise to the same risk as that identified by the first badge of 
fraud. 
With regard to the second badge, in a bulk sale the seller does 
not remain in possession of the goods transferred in bulk. The Ar-
ticle 6 statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
transferee has come into possession of the goods transferred in 
bulk.22 The revised Article 6 would include a definition of "date of 
the bulk sale" that would clarify timing issues in order to avoid 
any ostensible ownership problems. 23 But for the most part, this 
ostensible ownership badge of fraud lost currency with the promul-
gation of Article 9 of the UCC, and predecessor personal property 
security enactments. The bulk sales law is, of course, just as incon-
gruous in contemporary commercial practice given the advent of 
Article 9 and the resulting statutory abrogation of the Benedict u. 
Ratner24 rule. This will be discussed at some length later. 2n 
The thi;rd badge of fraud alerts courts to clandestine transac-
tions, and implicates the kinds of concerns that generate 
substantial debate among those interested in bulk sales law. The 
original Article 6 statute of limitations section provides that "[i]f 
the transfer has been concealed, actions may be brought or levies 
22. Original Article 6 provides that "ln]o action under this Article shall be brought 
nor levy made more than six months after the date on which the transferee took possession 
of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed." U.C.C. § 6-111 (1987). 
23. U.C.C. § 6-102 (1988) states that: 
(g)(i) 'Date of the bulk sale' means: 
(B) in all other cases, the later of the date on which: 
(I) more than ten percent of the net contract price is paid to or for tho 
benefit of the seller; or (II) more than ten percent of the assets, as measured by 
value, are transferred to the buyer. 
Id. §§ 6-102(I)(g)(i)(B)(I) & (II). 
The comment to this section further states that: 
[t]he connection between the time of transfer and the buyer's rights under the bulk-
sale agreement appears only for purposes of sales to which this Article applies. Sub-
section (i)(g) does not purport to affect the rights of creditors of a seller of property 
for other purposes or under other circumstances. 
Id. § 6-102 comment l(g). 
24. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). See also U.C.C. § 9-205 comments 1·4 (1987). 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
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made within six months after its discovery."28 That provision has 
spawned some litigation concerning what constitutes "conceal-
ment."27 The issue is treated below with regard to the broader 
fraud issue.28 Revised Article 6 rejects decisions which conclude 
that failure to comply with the Act constitutes concealment and 
absolutely insulates even noncomplying transactions which are not 
avoided within one year of the "alleged violation."29 For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the clandestine transfer, the 
transfer that prejudices the rights of those who are kept ignorant 
of it, is suspect in commercial fraud jurisprudence. 
The fourth badge of fraud, the fact that the transfer was made 
"pending the writ," addresses transfers accomplished at a time 
when the financial condition of the transferor is precarious. In-
deed, that is the time when the bulk transfer risk may be greatest, 
when the transferor can protect its own interests at the expense of 
its creditors by liquidating merchandise and departing with the 
cash. A transfer made "pending the writ" occurs when the trans-
feror concludes that its business can no longer operate for the 
benefit of both the business and its creditors. That could be be-
cause a large judgment or bankruptcy is on the horizon, or because 
the owners of the business have decided that their money and ef-
forts are better invested elsewhere. In any event, the "pending the 
writ" badge of fraud finds its bulk transfer parallel when the bulk 
sale takes place as the transferor's business is about to be termi-
nated. Only then would a sale of a majority of the transferor's 
merchandise take place out of the ordinary course of business.30 
26. U.C.C. § 6-111 (1987) (emphasis added). 
27. See, e.g., Columbian Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 314 Pa. Super. 585, 461 A.2d 
312 (1983) ; E.J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc. 33 A.D.2d. 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d 316 
(1969) (total noncompliance with Article 6 constitutes concealment); but see Lang v. Gra-
ham (In re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984); Chartered Bank v. Dianumt (/n re Del 
Norte Depot, Inc.), 716 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1983); SVM Inv. v. Mexican Exporters, Inc., 685 
S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Aerolineas Argentinas v. Hansen & Yorke Co., 12 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (mere noncompliance does not constitute 
concealment; concealment requires some affirmative act). 
28. See infra text accompanying note 150. 
29. U.C.C. § 6-110(3) (1988). The comment to this section states that .. (c}nses decided 
under the 1987 official text of Article 6 disagree over whether the complete failure to comply 
with the requirements of that Article constitutes a concealment that tolls the limitation. 
This Article adopts the view that noncompliance does not of itself constitute concealment." 
Id. comment 2; see also id. comment 3. 
30. See Ross v. Rodolpho (In re Villa Roe!, Inc.), 57 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985) 
("major part" means a majority of the transferor's inventory); Murdock v. Plymouth Enter., 
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The trust badge of fraud, for contemporary purposes, parallels 
the second badge of fraud, seller retaining possession of the assets. 
The bulk sales law does not implicate trust devices in a way that 
emphasizes a parallel between fraudulent conveyance law and ei-
ther original or revised Article 6. 
The sixth and final badge of fraud, concerning protestations of 
bona fides, is of limited contemporary pertinence,31 and will have 
no more application in the bulk sales context than it would in any 
other contemporary fraudulent conveyance. 
The Twyne's Case badges of fraud were designed to bridge the 
gap between actual and constructive fraud. They were first and 
foremost evidentiary tools, presumptions to aid the victims of a 
fraudulent conveyance in overcoming the difficulties of establishing 
an actual intent to defraud. 32 But it is best to distill both fraudu· 
lent conveyance and bulk sales laws down to their constituent 
elements, with respect to generic fraud law, so that the interests 
served by bulk sales legislation may be better understood. Con-
sider a bulk sale in terms of misrepresentation. By accepting 
delivery of goods or rendition of services at a time when a business 
maintains a stock of goods worth an amount in excess of the claims 
against the business, the business is constructively representing to 
its creditor that the stock of goods will be available to satisfy the 
obligations of the business. At least that is the fundamental fiction 
Inc. (In re Curtina Illt'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969, 977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[o]rdinnry 
course" means 1. the transfer was typical in the transferor's industry; 2. the transferor rou· 
tinely liquidated inventory by means of closeout sales, and 3. the transfer did not result in 
the discontinuance of any line of the transferor's business) (citing Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 
305 N.Y. 237, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953)); Bergen, Johnson & Olson v. Verco Mfg. Co., 690 
S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (same); National Bank v. Frydlewicz, 67 Mich. App. 417, 
241 N.W.2d 471 (1976) ("out of the ordinary course" means an extraordinary transaction); 
First Nat'l Bank v. Crone, 157 Ind. App. 665, 301 N.E.2d 378 (1973) (same). 
Revised Article 6 defines a sale as "in the ordinary course of the seller's business, if the 
sale comports with usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is 
engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices." U.C.C. § 6-102(l)(m) (1988). 
31. U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 5, 7A U.L.A. 654 (1984) ("recitals of 'good faith' can no 
longer be regarded as significant evidence of a fraudulent intent"). But see P. ALCES, supra 
note 6, at 11 5.02[l](f]: 
To the extent that this badge of fraud might still retain some currency, however, it is 
manifested in the courts' suspicion of recitals in documents evidencing the convey-
ance of property. For instance, it has been considered a badge of fraud to misstate 
the consideration attending the conveyance. Also, the courts have recognized that the 
mere recital of consideration above should not be given great probative effect. 
(footnotes omitted). 
32. P. ALCES, supra note 6 at 11 5.03[2]. 
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upon which the bulk sales law is premised.33 Of course, the busi-
ness never expressly made such a representation; the creditor 
infers fiscal well-being and intent to satisfy debts from the fact 
that the business maintains a stock of merchandise. Given 
problems of ostensible ownership,34 a creditor of a business draws 
that inference at its substantial peril. That peril is, of course, en-
hanced by the proliferation of secured credit. Nonetheless, the 
notion of constructive misrepresentation is the foundation of bulk 
sales law and any criticism of its incarnation must confront that 
fundamental incongruity. 
B. Early Nonuniform Responses 
The first bulk sales statutes were limited in scope to the par-
ticular enterprises and transactions that initially gave rise to the 
bulk sales risk. Perhaps the primary evil identified by the drafters 
of early acts was the clandestine transfer of assets. The fact that 
the bulk transferor sold its merchandise in secret evidenced the 
fraudulent nature of the sale. 
In a series of articles written as part of a study of pre-Uniform 
Commercial Code bulk sales legislation, Professor Frank Miller 
surveyed the early enactments and delineated their common and 
recurring characteristics. Miller divided his study by reference to 
33. See Elliott Grocer Co. v. Field's Pure Food :Mkt., Inc., 286 Mich. 112, 281 N.W. 
557 (1938). In that case, the defendants purchased fixtures from a corporation without. giv-
ing notice, which the plaintiff claimed violated the bulk sales law. The Michigan Supreme 
Court held that the bulk sales law was designed to prevent the sale out of the regular course 
of business of the "visible assets" of a business which possesses and uses merchandise and 
fixtures. The court determined that sales of fixtures in bulk, even though not in conjunction 
with the sale of merchandise, were prohibited by the bulk sales statute. Elliott, 281 N.W. at 
558. 
34. Professor Baird and Dean Jackson have argued that the ostensible ownership 
problem that occurs "whenever there is a separation of ownership and possession" can be 
easily cur~d by the development of public filing systems to put the commercial world on 
constructive notice of multiple claims to the same property. Baird & Jackson, Possession 
and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 186 (1983). 
However, Professor Mooney has suggested that ostensible ownership may not. in fact. con-
found commercial expectations in the ways envisioned by Baird and Jackson. ''The issue is, 
like most matters of public policy, a complex one which demands an investigation and anal-
ysis of numerous factual, behavior[ a!), and economic considerations." Mooney, The Mystery 
and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Ex-
tend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 683, 687-88 (1988). 
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the enterprises subject to bulk sales legislation,8~ the nature of the 
property transfers covered, 36 and the nature of the transactions 
falling within the scope of the pre-UCC acts.37 He ordered the en-
terprises by reference to the frequency with which they were 
included within the scope of the nonuniform statutes: first came 
retail mercantile businesses, 38 then wholesale mercantile busi-
nesses, 39 followed, in order, by manufacturing businesses, 40 repair 
shops,41 restaurants,42 farmers/ 3 businesses in which only services 
were sold,44 and, finally, a miscellaneous category.46 While the stat-
35. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. 
36. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Property Included, 1954 WASil. U.L.Q. 132. 
37. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to Be Attached to the Quantitative and Quali· 
tative Requirements Phrases of the Statutes, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 283. 
38. See Miller, supra note 35, at 9-13 (citing Juhas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 
1950) (conveyance by owner of bankrupt retail shoe business of 25% of inventory and 15% 
of value of its stock, without proper notice to creditors, violated California bulk sales law): 
Sproul v. Gambone, 43 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1942) (bulk sale of cigarette vending rna· 
chines by owner of bankrupt wholesale tobacco and candy business violated Pennsylvania 
bulk sales act); Langharn v. Zimmelman, 28 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (bulk sale law 
violated when owner of bankrupt jewelry store sold substantial portion of stock without 
proper notice to creditors)). 
39. /d. at 14-15 (citing North Am. Provision Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., 168 
Ark. 106, 269 S.W. 993 (1925) (finding wholesale mercantile business within scope of the 
pre-UCC bulk sales statute though business had no manufacturing capacity)). 
40. /d. at 16-25 (citing In re Laureate Co., 294 F. 668 (2d Cir. 1923) (stock of calendars 
and pictures which manufacturer was in process of attaching together characterized as mer-
chandise rather than raw materials and therefore proper subject of New York statuto); 
Gretzinger v. Wynne \fholesale Grocery Co., 183 Ark. 303, 35 S.W.2d 604 (1931) (sale of 
bakery within scope of Arkansas statute)). 
41. /d. at 26-28 (citing Yeager v. Powell, 219 Ark. 713, 244 S.W.2d 141 (1951) (bulk 
mortgage of all parts and accessories of combination sales agency, repair shopt and supply 
department within scope of Arkansas statute)). But see Wellston Radio Corp. v. Culberson, 
175 Ark. 921, 300 S.W. 443 (1927) (sale of electric repair shop not sale of "merchandise 
business" within bulk sales law); Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 270 
S.W. 605 (1925) (sale of automobile repair shop, in which various accessories were kept for 
purpose of repairing cars, did not violate bulk sales laws); Swanson v. De Vine, 49 Utah 1, 
160 P. 872 (1916) (sale of cobbler shop not within bulk sales laws, even though cobbler 
displayed shoelaces, polish, and brushes for sale). 
42. /d. at 28-37 (citing Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A. 
355 (1928) (applying Maryland statute to sale of restaurant); Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. 160, 
78 P. 784 (1904) (sale of restaurant and boarding house within scope of Washington 
statute)). 
43. /d. at 37-41; see also Samuelson v. Goldberg, 13 N.J. Misc. 204, 177 A. 260 (1935) 
(farmer's sale of livestock not within bulk sales act). But see Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill. 515, 198 
N.E. 341 (1935) (farmer's sale of major portion of stock violated bulk sales laws). 
44. Id. at 38-41. Miller observed that a majority of courts concluded that bulk sales 
legislation did not apply to service businesses. /d. at 39 (citing St. Matthews Motor Co. v. 
Schnepp, 306 Ky. 823, 209 S.W.2d 481 (1948); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Abrams, 270 A.D. 911, 
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utes were increasingly less likely to include enterprises that were 
further removed from the retail mercantile business, the context in 
which the bulk sales risk was first identified, it is not at all clear 
that the fraud risk is any less in bulk sales of the assets of other 
enterprises. Indeed, that has remained a conundrum under original 
Article 6,46 and perhaps will remain so under the revised version as 
well.47 
Another of the Miller survey articles concerned the nature of 
the property interests within the scope of the early enactments, 
specifically whether sales of assets other than merchandise were 
covered. Certainly many bulk sales of a retail mercantile business's 
inventory would be accompanied by its fixtures and equipment as 
well. Several of the early statutes included sales of fixtures within 
their scope.48 Inclusion of fixtures is rational insofar as the focus of 
bulk sales legislation should be on transactions that convert a fixed 
corpus of assets into a form sufficiently liquid to accommodate its 
swift removal from the reach of the seller's creditors. Equipment 
and fixtures are in the nature of assets that creditors rely upon in 
extending unsecured credit, and should be as much of a concern in 
bulk sales law as the merchandise sold by such businesses, though 
merchandise is arguably more liquid. It is likely that early statutes 
excluded equipment and fixtures from their scope because it was 
believed that the seller would have difficulty disposing of such as-
sets surreptitiously. That does not provide a sound rationale for 
excluding transfers of such assets, however, after facts indicate 
61 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1946), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 1009, 73 N.E.2d 582 (1947); Item Co. v. Na-
tional Dyers & Cleaners, 15 La. App. 108, 130 So. 879 (1930); La Salle Opera House Co. v. 
La Salle Amusement Co., 289 ill. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919)). 
45. ld. at 41-45. Typically, these businesses engaged primarily in the sale of senices. 
I d. (citing Wright v. Aaron, 214 Ark. 254, 215 S.W.2d 725 (1948); Meier Elec. & Mach. Co. \', 
Dixon, 81 Ind. App. 400, 143 N.E. 363 {1924); Northrop v. P.W. Finn Constr. Co., 260 Pa. 
15, 103 A. 544 (1918) (contracting); Ferrat v. Adamson, 53 Mont. 172, 163 P. 112 (1917) 
(poolrooms); Stewart v. Sulger, 174 A.D. 828, 161 N.Y.S. 489 (1916) (hotels); People's Sav. 
Bank v. Van Allsburg, 165 Mich. 534, 131 N.W. 101 (1911) (funeral parlors)). 
46. U.C.C. § 6-102(3) (1987) provides that the "enterprises subject to this Article are 
all those whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who 
manufacture what they sell." See also W. HAwKLAND, UNIFORM Cot.ntERCIAL Coo& SEJUES § 
6-102.05 at 19-24 (1984) (describing efforts to adjust scope of bulk sales law to include ser-
vice establishments). 
47. U.C.C. § 6-103(1)(a) (1988) provides that "this Article applies to a bulk sale if: (a) 
the seller's principal business is the sale of inventory from stock." 
48. For a list of these statutes see Miller, supra note 36, at 149 n.91. 
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that the seller was indeed able to sell equipment or fixtures out 
from under its unsecured creditors. 
The scope of the nonuniform legislation was further limited by 
the requirement that for a sale to be proscribed it had to be "in 
bulk,"49 though the meaning of that proviso was not always clear. 
The purpose was to identify transfers of substantial assets out of 
the ordinary course of the seller's business. In that way, the legisla-
tion would protect the creditors of the transferor from the risk of 
sales that the creditors would not anticipate in the ordinary course 
of commercial events. It would be inappropriate to protect the 
seller's creditors from those dispositions of assets that the creditors 
should have been able to anticipate. The term "in bulk," then, was 
construed to contemplate sales of a majority of a seller's merchan-
dise. It is not obvious, however, what commends that construction 
of the term other than some sense of convenience. The adverse 
consequences of a bulk sale could certainly be visited upon the 
seller's creditors even if an amount of assets comprising far less 
than a majority were sold in a manner that prejudiced the credi-
tors' interests.50 
Efforts to limit the scope of bulk sales legislation were proba-
bly a function of the concern that such legislation was an 
unwarranted imposition on commercial transactions. Early cases 
reasoned that bulk sales laws should be strictly construed because 
they were in derogation of the common law of sales. 51 By the time 
the UCC was pr~mulgated, the opposing camps were formed: The 
larger commercial interests that financed retail mercantile busi-
nesses as well as those who might purchase goods in bulk were in 
opposition to the creditmen's associations that developed the 
nonuniform bulk sales legislation. However, with the advent of se-
cured personal property financing, there was less reason for the 
49. P. ALCES, supra note 6, 11 4.03(3)[a]. 
50. California has adopted a nonuniform amendment to section 6-102(1) which re-
places "major part" with "substantial part/' See CAL. CoM. CODE § 6102(1) (West 1964 & 
Supp. 1990) ("Where the amount of the transfer ... is sufficient to prejudice the interests of 
creditors to a substantial degree ... a sale in the vicinity of 5 percent of the total inventory 
is a transfer of a 'substantial part of the inventory' and is subject to the bulk transfer provi-
sions."). See Reed v. Anglo Scandinavian Corp., 298 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 9 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 102 (9th Cir. 1971). 
51. See Miller, supra note 35, at 6 (citing Meier Elec. & Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 81 Ind. 
App. 400, 143 N.E. 363 (1924); United States Promotion Co. v. Anderson, 100 Ohio St. 68, 
125 N.E. 106 (1919)). 
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lenders to be concerned with bulk sales legislation. The same re-
sults accomplished by a bulk sale could be accomplished by a 
"bulk mortgage." As long as the lenders did not have to comply 
with Article 6 when executing an Article 9 secured transaction, 
there was no great reason to stand in firm opposition to any bulk 
sales legislation. And though bulk mortgages were subject to regu-
lation in some states,t~2 UCC Article 9 and the exceptions contained 
in section 6-103 operate to assuage the fears of large commercial 
finance interests. This will be explored in more detail below.03 
Finally, the language of some of the early statutes is worth 
noting to demonstrate further the affinity between bulk sales law 
and general commercial fraud law. Several states adopted the 
Pennsylvania form bulk sales statute, which provided that a non-
complying bulk sale (one not made sufficiently notorious) was 
"fraudulent and void as against the transferor's creditors."~ The 
Pennsylvania form was designed to invoke the general fraudulent 
conveyance law in order to provide the transferor's creditors with a 
means to recover the assets transferred in bulk. 115 The story of 
nonuniform bulk sales law in Ohio is particularly interesting with 
regard to fraudulent conveyance parallels. Ohio's bulk sales legisla-
tion, providing that a sale not in compliance with the statute was 
"fraudulent and void," was held unconstitutional under the Ohio 
State Constitution. r;s The Ohio legislature responded by rewriting 
the law to provide that a sale not in compliance with the legisla-
52. See Billig & Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: Transactions C01:ered by These Statutes, 39 
W.VA. L.Q. 323, 326-327 & nn. 14-17 (1933) (stating that "[t]he [pre·UCC} bulk sales laws 
of Arkansas, California, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, contain[ed] express provisions covering 
chattel mortgages"). With respect to instances where courts were called upon to determine 
whether bulk mortgages were within the scope of the statutes. Billig and Smith observed: 
The difference between the cases that hold that the [bulk sales law) applies to chattel 
mortgages and those that hold that it does not apply appears to rest upon the ques-
tion as to whether or not title passes to the goods conveyed under the mortgage or 
trust. In the cases holding that title remains in the mortgagor, it has been generally 
held that a chattel mortgage is not a 'sale, transfer or assignment.' In those sttltes in 
which it has been held that title does pas:; by the deed of trust or mortgage, the [bulk 
sales law) has been held to apply. 
Id. at 329 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 3 F.2d 52, 54 (E.D. Vn. 1924)). 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95. 
54. Billig, supra note 16, at 74. Eleven Jurisdictions adopted the Pennsylvania form 
bulk sales statute. See id. at 73 n.3 (statutes listed). 
55. Id. at 76-77 n.19 (citing Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, 177, 183 Pn. 387, 389 (1919); 
Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 336, 75 N.E. 404, 406 (1905)). 
56. See id. at 97 (citing Miller v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St. 207, 71 N.E. 631 (1904}). 
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tion was "presumed to be made with the intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors" of the seller.67 That formulation was also struck 
down as unconstitutional and the Ohio legislature finally had to 
amend the State Constitution in order to accommodate bulk sales 
legislation.68 What is clear from the Pennsylvania and Ohio legisla-
tion, however, is that bulk sales law was originally fraudulent 
conveyance law. That observation is also supported by considera-
tion of contemporary fraudulent disposition law. 
C. Affinity Between Fraudulent Disposition Law and Bulk 
Sales Law 
This Article maintains that bulk sales law is but one particular 
form of the general fraudulent disposition law. And, properly un-
derstood, general fraudulent disposition law includes fraudulent 
conveyance law under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth/0 the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act,60 its statutory successor, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act,61 section 548 of the Bankruptcy Reform 
57. OHIO REv. STAT. §§ 6343, 6344 (Page 1908). 
58. Billig, supra note 16, at 97-99 (citing Williams & Thomas Co. v. Preslo, 84 Ohio St. 
328, 95 N.E. 900 (1911)). The amended Ohio Constitution provided that <~[J]nws may be 
passed regulating the sale and conveyance of other personal property, whether owned by a 
corporation, joint stock company, or individual." OHIO CoNsT. art. XIII § 2 (1912). The sub-
sequent bulk sales law provided that: 
The sale, transfer, or assignment, in bulk, of any part or the whole of a stock of 
merchandise, or merchandise and the fixtures pertaining to the conducting of enid 
business, or the sale, transfer or assignment in bulk of the fixtures pertaining to tho 
conducting of said business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in tho 
regular and usual prosecution of the business of the seller, transferor, or assignor, is 
void as against the creditors of the seller, transferor, assignor, unless the purchaser, 
transferee, or assignee demands and receives from the seller, transferor, or assignor 11 
written list of names and addresses of the creditors of the seller, transferor and as· 
signor with the amount of the indebtedness due or owing to each and certified by the 
seller, transferor and assignor, under oath, to be a full, accurate, and complete list of 
his creditors and of his indebtedness; and unless the purchaser, transferee, or as· 
signee shall, at least five days before taking possession of such merchandise, fixtures, 
or merchandise and fixtures, or paying therefor, notifies personally, or by registered 
mail, every creditor whose name and address appears in said list, or of which he has 
knowledge, of the proposed sale and of the price, terms, and conditions thereof. 
OHIO REv. ConE § 1313.54 (Anderson 1953). 
59. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571) (applying to conveyances made with intent <~to delay, hinder 
or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts"). 
60. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Ar:r (U.F.C.A.), 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918). 
61. U.F.T.A., 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984). In updating the UFCA with the UFTA, the Con· 
ference cited the following considerations: 
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Act of 1978,62 and perhaps also the preference law formulated in 
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.63 But once the commercial 
fraud foundations of bulk sales law are appreciated, the affinity be-
tween fraudulent disposition law and bulk sales law may be 
understood in terms that will have some consequences for states 
that adopt the revision of Article 6 as well as for states that opt for 
the repealer alternative. That affinity is revealed by focusing on 
the important commercial principles served by both fraudulent 
disposition law and bulk sales law, and by recognizing the common 
factual predicates that support application of both bodies of com-
mercial fraud law. 
1. Prejudice to Unsecured Creditors.-Comment 2 to section 
3 of the UFT A, defining "value,, explains that in determining 
whether the value given by the buyer is sufficient to insulate the 
(1} The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 has made numerous changes in the sec-
tion of that Act dealing with fraudulent transfers and obligations, thereby 
substantially reducing the correspondence of the provisions of the federal bankruptcy 
law on fraudulent transfers with the Uniform Act. 
(2} The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporations, Banking 
& Business Law of the American Bar Association, engaged in revising the Model Cor-
poration Act,_ suggested that the Conference review provisions of the Uniform Act 
with a view to determining whether the Acts are consistent in respect to the treat-
ment of dividend distributions. 
(3) The Uniform Commercial Code, enacted at least in part by all 50 states, had 
substantially modified related rules of law regulating transfers of personal property, 
notably by facilitating the making and perfection of security transfers against attack 
by unsecured creditors. 
(4} Debtors and trustees in a number of cases have avoided foreclosure of secur-
ity interests by invok,ing the fraudulent transfer section of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act. 
(5} The Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the House of Delegates 
of the American Bar Association on August 2, 1983, forbid a lawyer to counsel or to 
assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is fraudulent. 
Id. (prefatory note). 
62. 11 u.s.c. § 548 (1988). 
63. Id. § 547. The UFCA requires that consideration must be given in good faith in 
order for the consideration to be deemed fair. U.F.C.A. § 3, 7A U.L.A. 427, 448-49 (1918). 
One reason for this good faith test may be the avoidance of preferential transfers to insiders. 
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 11, at 204-0S . .See also U.F.T.A. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 657 
(1984): 
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose 
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent 
debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to 
believe that the debtor was insolvent. 
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transaction from avoidance, the inquiry should focus on the value 
as "determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect a 
debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the 
debtor's unsecured creditors. "6" So, the object of the fraudulent 
disposition law is to vindicate the interests of an unsecured credi-
tor in the estate of its debtor. Actions by the debtor that 
compromise that interest may implicate commercial fraud princi-
ples and provide the basis for a reviewing court to avoid a 
challenged disposition. 
Once the debtor's unsecured creditors are perceived as having 
an interest in the assets of the debtor, the commercial fraud 
calculus is complicated. What is the nature and extent of that in-
terest? May it be divested by an adjustment of expectations 
effected by changing the commercial law? How may the interest be 
alienated or abandoned altogether? Does the interest arise as a 
matter of contract, tort, or property law principles and how might 
that matter? Confronting the contours of the enacted and pro-
posed commercial fraud law with regard to such issues reveals the 
balance that should inform resolution of recurring "trouble 
cases."66 
In appreciating that balance and the nature of the junior un-
secured creditors' interest that commercial fraud law is designed to 
vindicate, it is useful to analyze first the relation$hip between the 
debtor and its unsecured creditors. Upon liquidation of the 
debtor's business, the unsecured creditors will stand ahead of the 
owners and shareholders of the debtor-firm, but behind secured 
creditors to the extent of the secured creditors' collateral interests 
in particular (even if not specific)66 property in which the debtor 
has rights. The unsecured creditors' interests may be diluted or 
frustrated altogether in several different ways. The debtor may run 
the business into the ground, impairing even the claims of secured 
64. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 639, 650-51 (1984) (emphasis added). 
65. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 160 (1973), Twin· 
ing observed: 
/d. 
The "trouble case method" consists of examining in detail the processes involved in 
settling actual disputes. What happened, what each participant did in relation to the 
dispute, what steps were taken by what other persons, the final outcome, tho reason-
ing of the deciders, the effects of the decision on the parties themselves, on future 
trouble cases and on the general life of the group are to be considered in depth. 
66. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1987) (concerning after-acquired property). 
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creditors. Or the assets delivered to the debtor by an unsecured 
trade creditor may be subject to the after-acquired property inter-
est of an inventory financer. In that event, while the debtor retains 
the inventory, it is subject to the claims of the financer. Subse-
quently, when the inventory is sold, the financer will have a 
collateral interest in the accounts receivable generated by the sales 
as proceeds of the inventory collateral. Alternatively, the debtor 
may increase the salaries of its officers, thereby depleting the prof-
its realized from the sale of the as yet unpaid for inventory. The 
officers could also declare a dividend and pay the debtor's share-
holders with the proceeds of the inventory sold rather than paying 
the supplier-unsecured trade creditor the amount of the outstand-
ing invoice for the inventory. 67 The debtor could also execute a 
fraudulent or preferential transfer of the inventory. Finally, the 
debtor could sell the inventory in bulk and leave the jurisdiction, 
or otherwise impair the creditors' ability to recover on their claims. 
Clearly, debtors have the power to compromise the interests of 
their unsecured creditors. Which transactions should be policed by 
commercial fraud law and the manner in which they should be po-
liced are considerations crucial to an understanding of the place 
bulk sales legislation occupies in the commercial fraud regime. The 
work of Dean Robert Clark, treated in the next section of this Arti-
cle, provides a frame of reference. 
2. Conceptions of Fairness.-In a thoughtful and important 
article written over a decade ago, Dean Robert Clark investigated 
the normative foundations of fraudulent conveyance law and the 
consistent moral imperatives underlying the commercial law prin-
ciples that determine the duties a corporate debtor owes to its 
creditors. 68 He distilled the substance of commercial fraud law into 
four constituent concerns: Truth; Respect; Evenhandedness; and 
Nonhindrance.69 Application of these norms to the bulk transfer 
67. One of the reasons offered by the drafters of the UITA for rewriting the fraudu-
lent disposition law was to effect consistency between the fraudulent transfer law and the 
Revised Model Business Corporations Act's treatment of dividend distributions; see also P. 
ALcES, supra note 6, at 11 5.01[4)[e][iii]. 
68. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.. REv. 505 
(1977). 
69. ld. at 509-13. 
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context furthers an appreciation of the affinity between bulk sales 
and fraudulent disposition law. 
Clark describes the "Truth" norm as follows: "Truth: in con-
nection with transfers of property rights to others, a debtor is 
forbidden to tell lies to his creditors that will lead to the nonsatis-
faction of their claims."70 The debtor who transfers his assets to a 
purchaser for even a reasonably equivalent value may, in generic 
fraud law, be guilty of a misrepresentation. Recall the misrepresen-
tation foundation of the bulk sales law: the debtor who is indebted 
to unsecured trade creditors is deemed to be representing to them 
that the debtor's assets will be available for repayment of the 
debtor's outstanding obligations. Though we might question the 
reasonableness of a creditor's reliance on that kind of representa-
tion, there is no denying that bulk sales law is founded on just 
such a premise. Further, it is clear that misrepresentation liability 
may be premised on a failure to disclose when there is a duty to 
disclose. Bulk sales legislation provides such a duty to disclose, but 
it may be that it exists notwithstanding the enacted legislation if 
Clark is correct in identifying truthfulness as a normative impera-
tive in general fraudulent disposition law. 
Clark states, with regard to "Respect," that "[t]he debtor has 
a moral duty in transferring his property to give primacy to so-
called legal obligations, which are usually the legitimate, conven-
tional claims of standard contract and tort creditors, as opposed to 
the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders, and shrewder or 
more powerful bargaining parties."71 The debtor who transfers his 
assets in bulk puts his own interests ahead of those of his contract 
and tort creditors. Those creditors are left with perhaps uncollecti-
ble claims while the debtor receives cash. Here, too, there is a 
coincidence of normative foundation between bulk sales law and 
fraudulent disposition law. 
Clark describes the bifurcated nature of his third norm, 
"Evenhandedness": 
Whenever a debtor is or is about to become insolvent and thus una-
ble to satisfy all his creditors in full, the debtor should refrain from 
preferring one creditor over another. Similarly, in such cases credi-
tors should refrain from seeking such a preference. In either 
70. Id. at 509. 
71. Id. at 510-11 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
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instance, transfers resulting in better than equal treatment on the 
eve of liquidation proceedings should be undone-and may actually 
be undone in bankruptcy proceedings as voidable preferential 
transfers.'12 
Clark's description of the evenhandedness norm discloses the 
symbiotic relationship between fraudulent disposition law and 
preference law and the ultimate affinity between fraudulent dispo-
sition and bulk sales laws. The bulk sales legislation requires that 
the debtor give notice to all of his creditors so that each may pur-
sue whatever options are available to best position himself in light 
of the impending sale.'~3 The debtor who fails to give notice (as well 
as the transferee who conspires in that object) violates the even-
handedness norm in much the same way as the noncomplying bulk 
sale violates the respect norm. 
Clark recognized that the evenhandedness norm provides a ba-
sis for imposing sanctions on the transferee who has obtained a 
preferential disposition. That, of course, is not an idea that has 
been embraced by bankruptcy law. While a preferential transferee 
may be required to disgorge the fruits of the transfer, there is no 
further liability imposed on the transferee.7" Therefore, attorneys 
may have no qualms (other than moral ones) about advising their 
clients to accept or even seek a preferential transfer. Professor 
Douglas Baird recognized this incongruity in materials he pub-
lished for a conference marking the tenth anniversary of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: 
The damage remedy in tort law tries (to the extent money can do it) 
to restore things to the way they were before the injury took place. 
The defendant ends up having to pay an amount of money exactly 
equal to the damage done. At the end of the day, it bears all the 
costs of its conduct and the amount of money the parties are fight-
ing over is equal to the harm done. This analogy reveals a 
peculiarity of the existing remedy for preference law. The size of the 
preference is not in fact the same as the damage that the preferen-
tial transfer causes. In considering the problem of the voidable 
preference in bankruptcy, we should consider both the amount that 
is transferred and the damage that the transfer itself causes, just as 
72. Id. at 512. 
73. See U.C.C. § 6·105 (1987). 
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); Baird, Avoiding Powers Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
1988 ALI·ABA WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY 328. 
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in antitrust in devising the optimum penalty we must consider both 
the monopoly profits the defendant received [and] also the welfare 
loss that accompanied them.75 
Just as the transferee's return of the preferentially transferred as ~ 
sets to the debtor or its creditors may not compensate the creditors 
to the full extent of their loss, creditor-victims of a bulk sale may 
have reason to conclude that the remedial regime fixed by bulk 
sales law will be inadequate to compensate them for the loss suf-
fered as a consequence of the bulk sale. 
It is in the similarity between the remedial gaps in preference 
and bulk sales law that the affinity between fraudulent disposition 
law and the bulk sales law in terms of the evenhandedness norm is 
most apparent. The creditors prejudiced by a preferential transfer 
are in much the same position as are the creditors of a bulk trans-
feror who does not comply with the notice provision of bulk sales 
legislation. But what is crucial for the thesis of this Article is that 
Clark posited the fundamental normative affinity between fraudu-
lent conveyance law and preference law. Moreover, Clark 
supported that observation with a discussion of Twyne's Case, the 
crucial fraudulent conveyance decision, as a preference action.70 
Clark's final norm, "Nonhindrance," also conclusively supports 
the argument that fraudulent disposition law and bulk sales law 
share a common normative foundation. A debtor hinders its credi-
tors when it arranges its affairs so as to frustrate or confound its 
creditors' collection efforts.77 It is the conversion of inventory into 
a more liquid form out of the ordinary course of business that hin-
ders the creditors' collection efforts. So construed, every bulk sale 
is a transfer that results in hindrance of creditors. But only trans-
fers effected with an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud are 
actionable under the "actual intent" branch of fraudulent disposi-
tion law. So the distinction, or lack of one, between actual and 
constructive fraud must be treated before the circle is complete. 
75. Baird, supra note 74. 
76. Clark, supra note 68, at 513-14. 
77. /d. at 512-13. Clark describes the nonhindrance norm as the general norm in which 
the three norms of truth, respect and evenhandedness are subsumed. There may be transac-
tions in which the norms of truth, respect and evenhandedness are not offended and yet tho 
conveyance is considered fraudulent because it violates the general norm of nonhindrancc. 
/d. 
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That inquiry is pursued subsequently,78 but it is first necessary to 
introduce that inquiry by identifying certain commercial incongru-
ities that cloud the formulation of a viable theory of bulk sales law. 
D. The Incongruities 
The prefatory note to revised Article 6 acknowledges the eco-
nomic and legal adjustments that have deprived bulk sales 
legislation of a good measure of logical and moral force over the 
course of the last thirty-five years or so. Because it provides the 
foundation of much of the discussion that follows, pertinent por-
tions of the prefatory note bear reproduction here: 
In the legal context in which Article 6 ... and its nonuniform prede-
cessors were enacted, the benefits to creditors appeared to justify 
the costs of interfering with good faith transactions. Today, how-
ever, creditors are better able than ever to make informed decisions 
about whether to extend credit. Changes in technology have enabled 
credit reporting services to provide fast, accurate, and more com-
plete credit histories at relatively little cost. A search of the public 
real estate and personal property records will disclose most encum-
brances on a debtor's property with little inconvenience. 
In addition, changes in the law now afford creditors greater op-
portunities to collect their debts. The development of minimum 
contacts with the forum state as a basis for in personam jurisdiction 
and the universal promulgation of state long-arm statutes and rules 
have greatly improved the possibility of obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion over a debtor who flees to another state. 'Widespread enactment 
of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act has facili-
tated nation-wide collection of judgments. And to the extent that a 
bulk sale is fraudulent and the buyer is a party to fraud, aggrieved 
creditors have a remedy under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. Moreover, creditors of a merchant no longer face the choice of 
extending unsecured credit or no credit at all. Retaining an interest 
in inventory to secure its price has become relatively simple and in-
expensive under Article 9.79 
Each of the points in the foregoing excerpt is well taken. But the 
Reporter glosses over some considerations that bear on the viabil-
ity of bulk sales law. Though it may well be that credit reporting 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 135·148. 
79. U.C.C. Article 6 prefatory note (1988). 
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services have become increasingly sophisticated and accessible to a 
broader group of consumers, at least two things remain unclear: (1) 
the extent to which trade creditors take advantage of these ser-
vices, and (2) the extent to which a business's credit history 
matters when the time is right for the business to liquidate its as-
sets in bulk. After all, a bulk sale, by definition, is supposed to be a 
once-in-a-business-lifetime occurrence for the debtor. The debtor 
no longer has anything to lose when it executes the bulk sale. 
The Reporter also suggests that the unsecured trade creditor 
concerned with the bulk sales risk could take a purchase money 
security interest (PMSI) in the goods that it delivers to the 
debtor.8° First, as a practical matter, probably few suppliers have 
the sophistication or foresight to take advantage of the Article 9 
purchase money security interest protections. Though it could be 
argued that commercial law should discourage rather than reward 
ignorance or carelessness, it would still be true that suppliers of 
services would not have a means to avoid the bulk sales risk by 
taking a PMSI because they would be providing neither inventory 
nor equipment. 
Further, it is not clear why the disclosure of encumbrances in 
public real and personal property records matters with regard to 
the bulk sales calculus. Insofar as grants of collateral interest are 
excepted from the scope of bulk sales law in its Uniform Commer-
cial Code forms, both past and present, an unsecured creditor with 
the foresight to search the public records would find nothing that 
would enable it to recover amounts already outstanding. However, 
the creditor might discover that it is time to close the barn door, 
though perhaps too late to do any good. The Reporter does hit 
upon something here that bears further treatment in the next sub-
section of this Article: the uneasy tension between Articles 6 and 9. 
In turning to that tension, it is worthwhile to note that the 
Reporter's prefatory remarks do recognize the potential nexus be-
80. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1987). That section provides: 
A Security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent thnt it 
is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its 
price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives 
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is 
in fact so used. 
See also U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987). 
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tween bulk sales law and fraudulent disposition law-so long as 
the transferee is a party to the fraud. 
1. Personal Property Security.-Collateral interests in per-
sonal property are, as noted by the Reporter, commonplace. That 
is due largely to efforts of the drafters of the UCC who, in the 
promulgation of Article 9, made coherent a body of law that had 
long been a morass. There had been early efforts to distill the di-
vergent personal property security devices down to their common 
constituent elements.81 For reasons largely attributable to the im-
maturity of commercial jurisprudence (relative to the present 
interstate economy), the differences among state laws overwhelmed 
the commonalities and were a source of resistance to comprehen-
sive and preemptive uniform law. According to Professor Grant 
Gilmore, what happened between the early abortive comprehensive 
codification efforts and the promulgation of Article 9 was attribu-
table largely to adjustments in business expectations and the 
expansion of interstate commerce: 
Retrospectively, we are in a position to say that the Chattel Mort-
gage Act [1927] came too soon: the underground process of 
unification had not gone far enough; the diversity still had deep 
roots; the tangle could not yet be cut away. Article 9 came at the 
right time and has had a success as spectacular as the earlier [Chat-
tel Mortgage] Act's failure.82 
.. 
Professor Gilmore saw Article 9 as the inevitable product of its 
time, the product of the deliberate adjustment of fundamental 
conceptions. But in 1927, when the Chattel Mortgage Act was 
promulgated, the time for Article 9 was not yet ripe; commercial 
expectations and understanding could not be conformed to the 
comprehensive codification of personal property security interests. 
It is not merely coincidental that bulk sales legislation was enacted 
universally in the early twentieth century. Both of those circum-
stances, the proliferation of uniform bulk sales legislation and the 
failure of the Chattel Mortgage Act to be adopted anywhere, were 
the product of the same commercial law mind set. The uneasy ten-
sion between secured credit and bulk sales fraud existed then and, 
as this section of the Article will demonstrate, exists today. And it 
81. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 461, 465 n.G {1967) 
(citing 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.3 (1965)). 
82. ld. at 474. 
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is that tension that reveals the incongruity of the current as well as 
the proposed bulk sales legislation. Further, as subsequent sections 
of the Article will demonstrate, the elimination of bulk sales law 
altogether is inconsistent with the pervasive enactment and appli-
cation of fraudulent disposition law today. 
Professor Richard Sabella, in an article concerning the treat-
ment of secured transactions under the UFCA and UFTA, 
described the early personal property security law in terms that 
reveal the Article 9/Article 6 paradox.83 In its definition of "fair 
consideration," the UFCA provides that "fair consideration is 
given for property, or obligation ... (b) When such property, or 
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or 
antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as com-
pared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained."84 In 
contrast, the UFT A does not distinguish in its "reasonably 
equivalent value" concept (the statutory successor to "fair consid-
eration") between outright transfers and collateral transfers. The 
drafters of the UFT A explained their reasons for departing from 
the UFCA distinction: "Under this Act ... a transfer for security is 
ordinarily for a reasonably equivalent value notwithstanding a dis-
crepancy between the value of the asset transferred and the debt 
secured, since the amount of the debt is the measure of the value 
of the interest in the asset that is transferred."8G It seems then, 
that between the UFCA and the UFTA something fundamental 
about the relationship between personal property security law and 
commercial fraud law changed. 
Sabella suggests that there was good reason for the UFCA's 
"not disproportionately small" alternative definition of "fair con-
sideration. "86 At the time the UFCA was drafted, personal 
property security interests operated much the same way as did real 
property security interests. The grant of a collateral interest in as-
sets often effected a transfer of title to the grantee rather than 
merely the creation of a lien against the interest of the debtor.87 
The personal property security system in the early twentieth cen-
83. See Sabella, When Enough is Too Much: Overcollateralization as a Fraudulent 
Conveyance, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 773 (1987). 
84. U.F.C.A. § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 449 (1918). 
85. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 650 (1984). 
86. Sabella, supra note 83, at 782. 
87. /d. 
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tury, the heyday of bulk sales legislation, was vastly different from 
the current regime, and the scope of that difference is manifest in 
two vital respects. First, the rule of Benedict v. Ratner88 deemed 
fraudulent the debtor's continued possession of collateral: 
"[h]ypothecations (liens where the debtor retained possession) 
generally were thought to be per se fraudulent conveyances. "89 In 
fact, Sabella reports that the rationale underlying that rule was 
that the debtor's creditor "had the right to rely on its debtor's ap-
pearance of wealth. "90 That clearly evidences the fundamental 
affinity between the bulk sales law and fraudulent disposition law. 
Because the debtor's continued possession was deemed a badge of 
fraud, there was a substantial impediment to the personal property 
security regime that exists under Article 9. 
Further, Sabella points out that insofar as many states consid-
ered a chattel mortgage an absolute conveyance of legal title in the 
collateral to the creditor-secured party, the other creditors of the 
debtor-transferor would find it extremely difficult if not impossible 
to reach the debtor's equity in the personalty.91 Therefore, the 
claims of those other creditors could be more easily frustrated by a 
debtor and its transferee who sought to put the debtor's personalty 
beyond the reach of the debtor's general creditors. 
Recognize, then, that in that personal property security sys-
tem, bulk sales law and chattel mortgage statutes could peacefully 
coexist. The bulk sales legislation would have reinforced the pre-
sumption that a debtor's possession of assets gave rise to his 
creditors' justifiable reliance on such possession. Moreover, the 
fraudulent conveyance law's policing of such hypothecations of as-
sets was consistent with affording general creditors the means to 
avoid an outright sale of the assets. This was because, as Sabella 
88. 268 u.s. 353 (1925). 
89. Sabella, supra note 83, at 781. 
90. Id. at n.35. Sabella noted that "[t]he vitality of this doctrine continued well into 
the twentieth century." Id. (citing McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REv. 404, 406 n.9 (1933)). 
91. Id. at 781 (citing 2 J. CossEY, A PRACTICAL TREATlSE ON THE LAw OF CtlATTEL 
. MORTGAGES AS Am.UNISTERED BY THE CoURTS Of' THE UNITED STATES§§ 679-717 (1893)). As 
of 1910, seven states (Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee) had statutes which did not permit attachment of the mortgagor's equity of 
redemption. Id. at 782 n.41. Nine states (California, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, 
New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah) permitted attachmen~ but only 
where the senior creditor was paid in full before the junior creditor foreclosed on the collat· 
eral. /d. at n.42. 
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noted, the grant of a collateral interest in many states ·was an abso-
lute conveyance of title and, so far as general creditors would be 
concerned, indistinguishable from a bulk sale. 02 Add to that the 
fact that some early bulk sales enactments governed bulk mort-
gages, and the differences in the commercial landscape between 
the early part and the end of the twentieth century become 
glaring. 
The advent of Article 9 changed commercial lending dramati-
cally. No longer are there disparate personal property security 
statutes ordering the rights between borrower and lender by refer-
ence to often antiquated real property conceptions. Article 9 
provides a unitary concept: the Article 9 security interest. Con-
cepts of title and lien that proved a drag on commerce were 
replaced with provisions that accommodated equitable recognition 
of the rights of all parties affected by the secured transaction. It 
may not 'be necessary, in light of Article 9, to include in fraudulent 
disposition legislation a provision that protects the rights of a jun-
ior unsecured creditor whose debtor granted a comprehensive 
collateral interest to a senior all-assets lender. Indeed, the omission 
of a separate "reasonably equivalent value" definition for the se-
cured transaction supports that conclusion. 93 
Further, bulk sales law, in both its old and new forms, excepts 
secured transactions from its scope. The two sections that follow 
describe the treatment of secured transactions under original Arti-
cle 6 and the courts' reaction to the secured transaction exceptions. 
a. Secured Transactions Excepted from the Scope of Article 
6.-While section 6-102 establishes the scope of Article 6, section 
6-103 carves the exceptions from the general rule. Specifically, for 
purposes of this discussion, subsections 6-103(1) and (3) treat the 
interrelation of Articles 6 and 9. Those subsections provide: 
The following transfers are not subject to this Article: 
(1) Those made to give security for the performance of an 
obligation; 
(3) Transfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other security 
interests [.] 94 
92. /d. 
93. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1984). 
94. u.c.c. §§ 6-103(1), (3) (1987). 
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The design is to exclude so~called "bulk mortgages" as well as fore-
closure sales. Those exclusions were made in response to the 
banking lobby, which feared that if Article 6 applied to Article 9 
security interests, the efficiency of secured financing would be com-
promised.95 While Article 6 would not necessarily void the grant of 
a collateral interest, it would encumber the efficient execution of 
secured transactions by requiring notice procedures unnecessarily 
duplicative of the Article 9 financing statement. 
While the exception of Article 9 transactions from the scope of 
Article 6 may be consistent with the commercial policies underly-
ing Article 9, it is incongruous to retain bulk sales law once secured 
transactions are excepted from its scope. It is, as I have argued 
elsewhere,96 more sensible to abandon bulk sales legislation alto-
gether. That conclusion is clear once the consequences of a bulk 
sale, from the perspective of a creditor of the debtor-transferor, are 
compared with the consequences of the grant of an all-assets col-
lateral interest from the same perspective. In either case, the assets 
of the debtor are put beyond the reach of the junior unsecured 
creditor. It simply makes no difference whether the debtor has 
transferred the assets outright or encumbered them with a blanket 
security interest. In either event, those assets are not available to 
the junior creditor. Therefore, because the Article 9 secured trans-
action is a foundation of commercial jurisprudence and of our 
economy, it might be better to repeal Article 6 altogether than to 
maintain the incongruous tension between bulk sales and secured 
transaction law. 
b. Judicial Hostility Toward Exceptions.-Three decisions 
exemplify the courts' impatience with the conjunction of secured 
95. According to one commentator: 
[i]t was the strongly expressed opinion of [the bank lawyers] present that the Article 
6 coverage of security transfers is objectionable. In local bank practice an unsecured 
line of credit is frequently followed by a secured one. Secured credit arrangements 
routinely contemplate that successive security transfers will secure all of the bank's 
advances. Creditor notification as provided in Section 6-105(1) would be both an in-
tolerable nuisance and dangerous to the borrower. 
The lawyers who comprise this local group will play an important if indeed not a 
controlling part in detemining whether the Uniform Commercial Code is enacted. 
Letter from Professor Warren L. Shattuck to Professor Charles Bunn (OcL 9, 1952) (quoted 
in Hawkland, The Trouble with Article 6 of the U.C.C.: Some Thoughts About Section t;. 
103, 82 COM. L.J. 113, 114 (1977). 
96. P. ALcES, supra note 6, at 11 4.04[2](a). 
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transactions and bulk sales law. In each, the court struggled with 
the secured transactions exceptions from Article 6 and construed 
the exceptions in terms sufficiently narrow to preclude their appli-
cation. The result was to void the transfers as noncomplying bulk 
sales. 
Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc.97 held that the section 6-103(3) 
exception only applies in the case of a transfer to the secured party 
and does not apply to remove the sale from the scope of Article 6 if 
the sale was made to some third party for the benefit of the se-
cured party. Because a portion of the proceeds realized upon the 
sale of the assets subject to the collateral interest went to parties 
other than the secured creditor, the court concluded that "some 
creditors were preferred over [the complaining trade creditor] to 
his detriment."98 The court focused on the prejudicial impact that 
the foreclosure sale had on the junior unsecured creditor and 
found in such prejudice a reason to narrowly construe the scope of 
the subsection (3) exception. It is not clear, however, that the court 
was constrained by the statute to reach that result. After all, so 
long as the collateral that is sold in bulk was subject to the collat-
eral interest of a creditor, and not to the claims of the junior 
unsecured creditors, it is difficult to see how the junior creditor is 
any more prejudiced by the sale than it was by the initial grant of 
the collateral interest. Moreover, the grant of the collateral interest 
would be within the subsection (1) exception. Indeed, the Starman 
result may be explained by the fact that there was no evidence in 
that case that the creditor held a perfected security interest in the 
assets transferred in bulk. But if that were the ratio decidendi of 
the Starman opinion, it is not clear why it was necessary for the 
court to circumscribe so incongruously the scope of the subsection 
(3) exception. 
A 1987 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, Stone's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Pharmacy Accounting 
Management, Inc.,99 also offered a curious, or at least creative, 
construction of subsection (3) that resulted in application of Arti-
cle 6 to an Article· 9 foreclosure sale. Stone's Pharmacy, the 
plaintiff, held an unsecured claim against the defendant-transferor, 
97. 490 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
98. Starman, 490 S.W.2d at 383. 
99. 812 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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Pharmacy Accounting Management, Inc. (PAM). Inter First Bank 
held a blanket collateral interest in the assets of PAM, but permit-
ted PAM to transfer the assets to FoxMeyer free of the security 
interest so long as PAM turned over the proceeds of the sale to 
InterFirst. Stone's Pharmacy objected that the sale was not ex-
cepted from the scope of Article 6 by subsection 6-103(3). The 
court agreed and, relying on Starman, found that in order for the 
exception to apply, "the transferor must be in default and all the 
proceeds must be paid to the secured creditor."~00 Because the 
court was unable to determine that the secured party had a mature 
right to foreclose, the court concluded that the subsection (3) ex-
ception was not available. 
In Hixon v. Pride of Texas Distributing Co., 101 a Texas appel-
late court reached the same result, also reasoning "that in order for 
a transfer to be exempt under [6-103(3)] there must be evidence of 
a default on the part of the debtor which results in the secured 
party having a present right to foreclose."102 It is unclear what is 
gained by the requirement that in order for the exception to apply, 
the debtor must have been in default under the terms of the secur-
ity agreement. Certainly, that requirement could always be 
satisfied by the simple expedient of including an insecurity 
clause103 in the loan agreement, a common provision. 
The incongruity of excepting secured transactions from the 
scope of Article 6 and then the courts' circumventing the excep-
tions belies a fundamental tension in commercial law. Though it is 
difficult to distinguish the grant of an all-assets collateral interest 
from an absolute sale of those same assets, it is a distinction that 
retains considerable currency in fraudulent disposition law. Fur-
ther, it is not always clear that the scope of general fraudulent 
disposition law is drawn in terms that recognize the commercial 
I d. 
100. Stone's Pharmacy, 812 F.2d at 1066. 
101. 683 S.W.2d 173 {Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
102. Hixon, 683 S.W.2d at 178. 
103. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987). That section states: 
Terms providing that one party or his successor in interest may accclerote payment 
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "when he 
deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean 
that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect. of 
payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is 
on the party against whom the power has been exercised. 
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and economic reality of certain dispositions. The difficulty that 
courts have in confronting the fraudulent transfer aspects of cer-
tain leveraged business acquisitions provides an analogous context 
in which to observe the affinity between bulk sales and fraudulent 
disposition law. The next section of this Article treats the lever-
aged business acquisition jurisprudence that has influenced 
fraudulent disposition law generally and may, more specifically, ac-
commodate an understanding of the relation between bulk sales 
law and general commercial fraud principles. 
2. Leveraged Business Acquisitions.-From the perspective 
of general commercial fraud principles, there are certain similari-
ties between bulk sales law and fraudulent disposition law as 
applied to leveraged business acquisitions or "LBOs." The varia-
tions on the LBO theme are legion, 104 yet they are fundamentally 
similar.105 Before the transaction, the target has shareholders who 
have an equity interest in the target and unsecured trade creditors 
who have an interest in the assets of the target and who are pro-
tected by bulk sales law to the extent that the enterprise is within 
the scope of Article 6. In order to cash out their interest, the share-
104. Professor Carlson has identified alternative LBO forms: (1) Where a shell com-
pany purchases the stock of a target company with the proceeds of a loan secured by tho 
target company's stock; (2) same as (1) above, except instead of using the target's stock as 
security, the shell company causes the target to grant an upstream secured guaranty; (3) 
same as (1) above, except after the target's stock is acquired by the shell company, both 
companies merge, and the merged entity mortgages its assets to secure the loan; (4) Tho 
management group is already a shareholder in the target company, and to obtain full con-
trol the target secures a loan against its assets, and uses the proceeds to redeem its 
outstanding shares, so the management group is the only shareholder; (5) same as (4) above, 
except the target re-lends the proceeds to the management group which then buys out other 
owners of the target company with the loan proceeds; (6) A loan is secured against a subsidi-
ary of the target company, and the proceeds are used by the management group to redeem 
the target company's stock. See Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 
73, 80-83 (1985). 
105. A typical LBO occurs in this way: 
The aging management and shareholders (sellers) of a privately held company ap· 
proach a group interested in acquiring the company. Ambition-rich but relatively 
cash-poor, the acquisition group arranges financing through a bank or commercial 
finance company. The lender advances the loan proceeds against the assets (accounts 
receivable, inventory, equipment, real property) of the acquired company. The acqui-
sitions group pays for the sellers' interest in cash (and perhaps a promissory note). 
Sellers transfer ownership of the company and its assets to the acquisition group sub-
ject to the security and perhaps mortgage interest of the lender. The individual 
members of the acquisition group, at the insistence of the secured lender, often will 
execute personal (usually secured) guaranties of the acquisition loan. 
Alces & Dorr, supra note 11, at 560. 
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holders sell their equity interest to the acquisition group which 
"leverages" the assets of the target to finance the acquisition. As a 
consequence of the transaction, the unsecured creditors of the tar-
get who, before the LBO, stood ahead of the equity holders, are 
now subordinate to the secured party-acquisition lender who fi-
nanced the LBO. But what matters for constructive fraudulent 
transfer purposes is that the target does not benefit from the ac-
quisition loan. The proceeds are funnelled through the target to 
the selling shareholders and the members of the acquisition group 
own and control a business without having invested substantial 
capital. The unsecured trade creditors are prejudiced because the 
target did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for the hypothecation of its assets. And so long as the target was 
insolvent at the time of the LBO or as a result of it, 100 the transac-
tion may be avoided as a constructively fraudulent transfer. 
There is little doubt that the typical LBO is a fraudulent 
transfer. Even the staunchest critics of fraudulent transfer law, as 
now enacted, admit as much.107 The issue, as developed in the 
courts108 and law review commentaries, 109 is whether the fraudu-
lent disposition law should apply to the leveraged bl;lSiness 
acquisition. There are at least three perspectives that bear consid-
eration and which, properly understood, suggest the affinity 
between bulk sales law and general fraudulent disposition princi-
ples. The following three sections of this Article present the three 
approaches in a nutshell.110 
a. Contract Bargain Model.- Dean Jackson and Professor 
Baird developed the contract bargain model to define the scope of 
fraudulent transfer law: 
[O]ne must recognize that the debtor-creditor relationship is essen-
tially contractual .... The ambition of the law governing the debtor-
creditor relationship, including fraudulent conveyance law, should 
provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would 
106. See U.F.C.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1984). 
107. See Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conueyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 
V AND. L. REV. 829, 851 (1985). 
108. SeeP. ALcES, supra note 6, ~ 5.02[4][a) and cases cited therein. 
109. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 107. 
110. See also Alces, Presentation, "Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act to Leveraged Buyouts, .. 1989 AssociATION OF AMERICAN LAw Scuom.s ANNUAL 1\fEEnNG. 
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have agreed to if they had the time and money to bargain over all 
aspects of their deal.111 
Baird and Jackson's conclusion, then, is that debtors and their 
creditors would not contract for a body of private fraudulent trans-
fer law that would preclude the LB0.112 The unsecured trade 
creditors would not, assuming they know what is good for them, ex 
ante, preclude LBOs because LBOs are, according to Baird and 
Jackson, in the interest of the unsecured creditors.113 
The contract bargain model has been criticized on several ba-
ses. Professor Carlson has argued that the model does not take into 
account the interests of the acquisition lender: "The person who 
pays the bill under fraudulent conveyance law is the third party 
who may not retain a gift or dividend. Why should that party par-
ticipate in a hypothetical creditor's bargain?"114 Carlson's 
argument is that LBOs should be subject to even less fraudulent 
disposition exposure than would be dictated by the Baird and 
Jackson contract bargain model. In fact, Carlson elsewhere has ex-
pressed a deep contempt for the premise of the Baird and Jackson 
contract bargain analysis.115 
Professor Smyser, in one of the most articulate criticisms of 
the Baird and Jackson approach, has formulated the deficiencies 
and shortsightedness of the contract bargain model: 
Professors Baird and Jackson's argument is premised on a laissez 
faire approach which views fraudulent conveyance statutes as a pa-
ternalistic interference with freedom of contract. . . . {They] fail to 
consider carefully the extent to which the fraudulent conveyance 
statutes, by limiting the application of the constructive fraud provi-
sions to transfers for inadequate consideration made under 
circumstances of insolvency, or near insolvency, restrict the statutes' 
application to transactions which creditors would in fact generally 
find objectionable .... [And they] fail to analyze the underlying fi-
nancial dynamics of leveraged buyouts and thus ignore the serious 
potential for abuse of creditors inherent in leveraged buyouts of fi-
nancially troubled companies.116 
111. Baird & Jackson, supra note 107, at 835-36. 
112. ld. 
113. /d. at 853. 
114. Carlson, supra note 104, at 103 n.95. 
115. See Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1354 (1987). 
116. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the Fraudu· 
lent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.R. 781, 791 (1988). 
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Smyser also notes that the safeguards which Baird and Jackson 
contend are in place to protect unsecured trade creditors simply 
are not available.117 For example, Baird and Jackson argue that 
larger creditors would be in a position to insist upon negative 
pledge clauses in their contracts with the target. The protections 
afforded by such contract provisions would, in turn, inure to the 
benefit of the other creditors of the target who might not have suf-
ficient bargaining power to insist upon similar provisions in their 
own agreements.118 But Smyser responds that "the creditors who 
are in a position to have the greatest leverage in their negotiations 
with the [target may not] have an actual incentive to protect the 
interests of other creditors. "119 
Further, the contract bargain model causes the same uneasi-
ness as many other applications of micro-economic principles to 
commercial transactions. We are just not always sure that individ-
ual actors know what is best for them and can take care of 
themselves or that it makes sense to entertain the fiction that all 
transactors will, collectively, reach the best conclusions. The con-
cept of actual consent is also troublesome in contract law, as is the 
relationship between tort and contract generally. Perhaps most 
troublesome is the problem of indeterminable transaction costs. 
b. Property Model.-In response to the Baird and Jackson 
contract bargain model, the commentators, as well as the courts, 
have adopted an approach that may perhaps best be labelled the 
"property model." That approach focuses on the language of uni-
form fraudulent disposition law and recognizes that the creditors 
of the debtor-transferor in fact have a property right in the assets 
of the target that is protected by fraudulent disposition law. In-
deed, this is perhaps the dominant paradigm in the literature and 
the case law.120 
There is a similarity between the contract and property mod-
els. Both contemplate the right of the unsecured creditor/victiJll to 
alienate the interest that is compromised by the LBO. But then 
the approaches diverge in the way each calculates the damage re-
117. Id. 
118. Baird & Jackson, supra note 107. 
119. Smyser, supra note 116, at 787 n.16; see also Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law 
and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUl>L L. REv. 1491, 1511 (1987). 
120. See Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a Property Right, 9 CARDOZO L. RE\•. 
843 (1987). 
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covery available to the victim. The contract model dictates that 
the unsecured creditor cannot recover damages for what it would 
have gladly surrendered willingly in the first place.121 The property 
model, on the other hand, suggests that you can recover, at least in 
the LBO context, the full value of the property fraudulently 
transferred. 122 
An elaboration of the property model promulgated in the ex-
press provisions of the UFCA, UFTA and Bankruptcy Code 
section 548 has been urged by the commentators. Professor Carl-
son would protect the property rights of the transferee by his 
construction of the savings clause. 123 This statutory construction 
supports Carlson's thesis, similar to Baird and Jackson's, that 
LBOs are essentially good for unsecured creditors. LBOs accom-
modate the infusion of streamlined management.124 Carlson sees 
the LBO as an effort to improve the financial condition of the tar-
get rather than an effort to compromise the interests of many in 
favor of the few. So unless the acquisition lender actually intends 
to harm the target and the target's creditors, Carlson would not 
sanction the application of fraudulent disposition law to frustrate 
LBOs. 
Professor Sherwin reaches a very similar result by her con-
struction of the "good faith" element in the "fair consideration" 
definition in the UFCA.126 She would focus on the restitutionary 
nature of fraudulent disposition law to support her conclusion that 
121. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 107, at 834, 836-43. 
122. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability, Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1972) ("no one can take tho enti-
tlement to private property from the holder unless the holder sells it willingly and at tho 
price at which he ... values the property"). 
See also U.F.C.A. section 9(1) which provides that a creditor may "(a) [h]avo tho con· 
veyance set aside or the obligation anulled ... or (b) [d]isregard the conveyance .. . " and 
U.F.T.A. § 7(a) which provides that a creditor may obtain "(1) avoidance of the transfer or 
obligation ... ; (2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred . 
" 
123. Carlson, supra note 104, at 86-87 ("The phrase 'to the debtor' seems to be a 
drafting error .... Hence, section 548(c) should be read as if 'to the debtor' were omitted .. 
. [so) section 548(c) focuses on what the lender gives, not on what the lender gives to the 
debtor.") (emphasis in original). 
124. See id. at 95 ("[t]he LBO produces new management with a credible chance to 
increase cash flow, thereby further improving the position of the unsecured creditors"). 
125. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 
MINN. L. REv. 449, 468 (1988) (arguing that unless a lack of good faith is present an LBO 
should not be considered fraudulent (relying on U.F.C.A. § 3, 7A U.L.A. 427, 448 (1918)). 
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some insidious intent on the part of the transferee is prerequisite 
to sanctioning the trade creditors' recovery from the transferee. It 
is apparent, however, that both Carlson and Sherwin at least im-
plicitly recognize that the unsecured trade creditors of the target 
have a property interest in the assets of the target. They only dif-
fer in the way and the extent to which they would construe the 
uniform fraudulent disposition law to vindicate that property 
interest. 
c. Tort Model.-Finally, it may advance the commercial 
fraud law debate to recognize the tort aspects of a bulk sale or 
fraudulent disposition proscribed by the UFCA, UFT A, or the 
Bankruptcy Code. The bulk sales law's focus on misrepresentation 
principles was noted at the outset of this Article.126 But, it is plau-
sible to perceive the LBO as an intentional, not merely a 
constructive, misrepresentation.127 
Another commentator has described the tortious nature of a 
fraudulent disposition: "Fraudulent conveyances are, after all, in 
the nature of torts. A lender that draws on the upstream guaranty 
of an insolvent subsidiary takes property that otherwise would 
generally be available to creditors of the insolvent subsidiary. Such 
an act seems analogous to a tort. m 28 Perhaps it is most analogous 
to the tort of conversion, a tort that is essentially premised op 
strict liability129 and which contemplates as damages the victim's 
recovery of either the converted property or the value of the con-
verted property.130 That perception of the tort aspects of an LBO 
also reinforces the view that unsecured trade creditors have a 
property right in the debtor-transferor's assets. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. 
127. See Alces, Generic Fraud and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDozo 
L. REv. 743, 764 (1987) ("(o]nce the relationship between constructive fraudulent transfer 
law and intentional fraudulent transfer law is understood, it is no longer so clear that •.. 
LBOs should not be subject to avoidance as transactions intended to defraud the debtor/ 
transferor's unsecured creditors"). 
128. Schwarcz, The Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance Law on Future Adr:ances Sup-
ported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CARDOZO L. RE\'. 729, 735 n.22 
(1987}. 
129. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 97 (4th ed. 1982). 
130. Id. See also Sloan v. Butler, 148 Ark. 117, 228 S.W. 1046 (1921); West Tulsa Belt 
Ry. Co. v. Bell, 54 Okla. 175, 153 P. 622 (1915); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.\'. O'Donnell, 49 
Ohio St. 489, 32 N.E. 476 {1892}. For Article 9 conversion cases, see, e.g., Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 550 F.2d 256 {5th Cir. 1977), and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 
S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
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Professor Smyser implicitly endorses the tort law conceptions 
of the leveraged business acquisition. She concludes that LBOs are 
no better, so far as the trade creditors of the target are concerned, 
than corporate dispositions proscribed by the corporate law. 
Fraudulent disposition law, then, should be utilized to compensate 
the unsecured trade creditors of the target for the harm caused by 
the LBO. 
[T]he remedy resulting from the application of fraudulent convey-
ance statutes must be consistent with this purpose [avoidance of 
prejudice to unsecured creditors] .... [T]he remedy should be an 
equitable one designed to place the parties to the transfer in the 
position they would have occupied had the improper transfer not 
occurred.131 
Once construed in tort terms, fraudulent disposition law may be 
applied to address several of the problems that have concerned 
courts confronting the fraudulent disposition issues presented by 
LBOs.132 
131. Smyser, supra note 116, at 821: Smyser's article may be considered an endorse· 
ment of the application of Clark's approach to LBOs as fraudulent dispositions. Also note 
that Clark incorporated the Hand formula (B < P x L) with regard to piercing the corpo· 
rate veil. Clark, supra note 68, at 540-60. 
132. For example, in determining who is the proper party plaintiff in any LBO as 
fraudulent transfer action, distinctions exist between present and future creditors. UFT A 
section 4(a) provides that transfers made or obligations incurred are fraudulent as to pro· 
sent and future creditors if made or incurred: 
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; 
[derived from UFCA section 7) or 
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer 
or obligation, and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for 
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation 
to the business transaction; [derived from UFCA section 5) or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that 
he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they be-
came due. [derived from UFCA section 6] 
U.F.T.A. § 4(a), 7 A U.L.A. 652 (1984). 
UFTA section 5(a) provides that transfers made or obligations incurred by tho debtor 
are fraudulent as to present but not future creditors if made or incurred "without receiving 
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was 
insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obliga-
tion." U.F.T.A. § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1984). This section was derived from U.F.C.A. § 4, 7A 
U.L.A. 474 (1918). A proper party defendant in an LBO as fraudulent transfer action may 
include selling shareholders. See, e.g., Sharrer v. Sandles, 477 N.Y.S.2d 897, 103 A.D.2d 873 
(1984) (court invalidated collateral interest sellers of stock had taken in target's assets); tho 
acquisition group, e.g., Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Surety Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 70 Bankr. 920 
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The point here, however, is to recognize that an LBO is a form 
of bulk sale.133 Fundamentally, there must be consistent principles 
in the various incarnations of commercial fraud law and those 
principles must, as well, be consistently applied. It is for that rea-
son that LBO cases have something valuable to say for the student 
of bulk sales law. The next sections of the Article treat develop-
ment of the pertinent LBO case law by focusing on the leading 
case, United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.134 
3. Constructive and Actual Fraud Distinguished.-lt is gen-
erally understood in commercial fraud law that there are two kinds 
of fraud: constructive and actual.13~ Actual fraud contemplates in-
sidious intent; it is what generally comes to mind when reference is 
made to misrepresentation. It is difficult to prove because the trier 
of fact must determine that the defendant had a particular intent, 
a subjective and problematic determination. Constructive fraud li-
ability, on the other hand, is imposed on a defendant not so much 
because of what the defendant did as because of the effect that the 
defendant's actions had on the plaintiff. The focus, in commercial 
fraudulent disposition law, is on prejudice to the plaintiff rather 
than the benefit realized by the defendant.136 Constructive fraud 
liability has matured as a surrogate for actual fraud liability as a 
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (acquisition group held liable); and the acquisition finaneer, e.g., United 
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (court invalidated acquisi· 
tion financer's collateral interest in target's assets), aff'd sub nom .• United States v. Tabor 
Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
Reference to tort principles also provides guidance on issues concerning the extent of 
the plaintiff's recovery. See Baird, supra note 74. 
133. Professor Carlson equates an LBO with a form of bulk sale. See Carlson, Is 
Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 643, 674 n.75 (1987). 
134. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
135. The distinction between actual fraud and constructive fraud-indicated by "signs 
and marks of fraud"-was first set forth in Twyne's Case, 3 Coke Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 
(Star Chamber 1601). This distinction was later incorporated into UFCA section 7. Compare 
U.F.C.A. § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918) (focusing on actual intent of transferor) with U.F.C.A. §§ 
4-6, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 507 (1918) (focusing on lack of "fair consideration" and financial 
condition of debtor). 
For cases discussing this distinction, see Foffey v. Winninger, 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 
N.E.2d 154 (1973); Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 456 S.W.2d 673 (1970); 
Snell v. Comehl, 81 N.M. 248, 466 P.2d 94 (1970). 
136. According to the UFI'A, "value" is to be determined in light of the purpose of the 
Act to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the debtor's un· 
secured creditors. Consideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not 
satisfy the statutory definition. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 650·51 (1984). 
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response to the evidentiary problems inherent in proving a defend-
ant's actual intent. 
a. The Distinction Blurred: UFT A.-At the margins, the 
distinctions between constructive and actual fraud may blur. It is 
recognized that insofar as actual intent to defraud is generally not 
susceptible of direct proof, 137 it must be established by reference to 
objective indicia. And those indicia, typically, also signal the 
prejudice to the plaintiff that is the focus of constructive fraud 
law. 
In the UFTA, the merger between constructive and actual 
fraud is manifest. The UFTA, like its predecessor, the UFCA, pro-
vides that transfers made "with the actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud any creditor of the debtor" are voidable by those who 
were creditors of the debtor at the time of the transfer and by 
those who become creditors of the debtor sometime thereafter .138 
The UFT A elaborates the indicia of actual intent to defraud: 
(b) In determining actual intent ... consideration may be given, 
among other factors, to whether: 
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer; 
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, 
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(6) the debtor absconded; 
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or 
the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a sub-
stantial debt was incurred; 
137. See Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 704 F. Supp. 392, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (cit-
ing Rea v. Missouri, 84 U.S. 532, 543 (1873); Goshen Litho, Inc. v. Kohls, 582 F. Supp. 1561, 
1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
138. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984); see U.F.C.A. § 7, 7A U.L.A. 448 (1918). 
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(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business 
to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the 
debtor.139 
861 
That list of indicia is reminiscent of the Twyne's Case badges of 
fraud, which were discussed earlier in this Article.1• 0 Several of the 
UFTA indicia conjure images of bulk transfer law. But more perti-
nent for the argument here are elements (8), value of consideration 
received in exchange by the debtor, and (9), financial condition of 
the debtor. These two elements are also the principal focus of the 
constructive -fraud provisions of the UFT A.141 There is not only a 
coincidence of elements between the actual and constructive fraud 
bases of avoidance but a duplication of the indicia. That confirms 
the fundamental similarity of the two forms of fraudulent disposi-
tion law, at least at the margins. 
b. United- States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.-The purpose 
underlying discussion of fraudulent disposition ramifications of 
LBOs in this Article is to suggest that the lesson learned from dili-
gent study of LBOs has taught the commercial bar a good deal 
about the general nature of commercial fraud law. That lesson may 
aid understanding of the repeal and revision alternatives of Article 
6. Perhaps no decision has had a greater impact on fraudulent dis-
position law as it pertains to LBOs than has Tabor Court 
Realty.142 A discussion of that case will elucidate the application of 
fraudulent disposition law, both constructive and actual, to the 
typical bulk sales context: That result is a potential consequence of 
the partial or complete abrogation of the uniform bulk sales law. 
Raymond Colliery Co. (RC), a closely held corporation, was 
the parent of several coal mining subsidiaries. In addition to the 
subsidiaries, RC owned real property used for the mining of coal. 
When RC began to experience serious financial difficulties, the 
principals of RC decided to sell the corporation. Sale of the corpo-
ration was accommodated by acquisition financing provided to the 
purchasers by Institutional Investors Trust (IIT). As a condition of 
the financing, IIT took a collateral interest in the assets of RC as 
well as in the assets of the subsidiaries owned by RC. The United 
139. U.F.T.A. § 4(b), 7 A U.L.A. 653 (1984). 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31. 
141. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1984). 
142. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
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States government sought to unravel the transaction in an effort to 
recover unpaid taxes. 
The United States attacked the LBO as both a constructive 
and actual fraudulent conveyance under the Pennsylvania UFCA. 
With regard to the constructive fraud count, the government ar-
gued both that RC had not received a fair equivalent for what it 
gave to liT143 and that liT had not transferred the loan proceeds 
to RC in good faith. 144 
The district court found that the government had established 
the bases of constructive fraudulent conveyance liability and also 
determined that liT was chargeable with knowledge of the conse-
quences of its actions.14G Therefore, insofar as the LBO operated to 
the prejudice of the unsecured creditors of RC, the court found 
that actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud was also established 
by the record. The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's determi-
nation and found untenable the defendant's argument that 
fraudulent disposition law was inapplicable to LBOs.146 
The Third Circuit focused on the prejudicial impact of the 
LBO and the transactors' knowledge that prejudicial consequences 
would necessarily flow from their actions: "[A]n intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud creditors may be inferred from transfers in which 
consideration is lacking and where the transferor and transferee 
have knowledge of the claims of creditors and know that the credi-
tors cannot be paid."147 Consider the impact that observation 
could have on th~ application of the intentional fraudulent disposi-
tion law to bulk sales. There is other authority supporting such a 
broad construction of the intent element in fraudulent disposition 
law.148 The Third Circuit's discovery and implementation of that 
143. UFCA sections 4, 5, and 6 each require for constructive fraud that there be a lack 
of "fair consideration." U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 507 (1918). Fair consideration is 
defined in section § 3(a) to require that there be a "fair equivalent" given in exchange for 
the property which is transferred. ld. § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. 448. 
144. The UFCA section 3(a) definition of fair consideration also requires that tho ox-
change be made in "good faith." Id. 
145. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 585 (M.D. Pa. 1983). 
146. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d at 1297. 
147. ld. at 1304. 
148. Se, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (/n re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); Bank 
of Pa. v. Adlman (In re Adlman), 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976): Prisbrey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 
170 (lOth Cir. 1974); De West Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 418 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976); Elliot v. Elliot, 365 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. 58th St. Plaza 
Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Process·Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. 
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coincidence may have a significant impact on commercial fraud ju-
risprudence. It invites broader application of commercial fraud 
principles to avoid prejudice to junior unsecured creditors in both 
the fraudulent disposition and bulk sales contexts. 
c. Characterization of the Bulk Sale: LBO Parallels.-The 
consequence of an LBO, from the perspective of the target's un-
secured creditors, is divestment of the assets to which those 
creditors were looking, at least in some metaphysical way, to real-
ize on their claims against the target. Similarly, the bulk sale 
divests the transferor of the assets to which its creditors were look-
ing to realize on their claims. The distinction between the two 
transactions is in the value realized by the target/bulk transferor. 
Given the operation of the fraudulent disposition solvency and rea-
sonably equivalent value/fair consideration criteria, an LBO is 
virtually always subject to avoidance as a constructively fraudulent 
disposition. The target receives no value1" 9 and either is insolvent 
at the time of the LBO or is rendered insolvent as a result of the 
transaction. Further, as Tabor Court Realty demonstrates, it is 
not difficult for a court to infer that the transferee was well aware 
of the impact the LBO would have on the target's unsecured credi-
tors and, on that basis, to find sufficient evidence of an actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. 
In the case of a bulk sale, however, the commercial fraud anal-
ysis differs given the dynamics of the transaction. The transferee 
may well, and indeed in the ordinary course would, pay a reasona-
bly equivalent value for the assets transferred in bulk. Of course, if 
the transferee does not do so, it is not difficult for a court to void 
the sale as a constructively fraudulent disposition. But what of the 
bulk sale in which the transferee does pay a reasonably equivalent 
value but does not comply with the notice requirements of either 
original or revised Article 6? The Reporter of a preliminary draft 
Supp. 333 (N.D. Til. 1964); reu'd, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 U.S. 957 
(1967). 
149. Compare Baird & Jackson, supra note 107, at 853 ("(w)ith the buyout may come 
more streamlined and more effective management") and Carlson, supra note 104, at 95 
("LBO produces new management with a credible chance to increase cash flow, thereby 
further improving the position of the unsecured creditors") with Smyser, supra note 116, at 
801 ("[a)s yet, the evidence appears insufficient to support a conclusion that leveraged 
buyouts produce real economic gains in terms of corporate productivity or management effi-
ciency"); see Note, supra note 119, at 1501 ("any indirect benefits accruing to a company 
following an LBO are merely conjectural and indeterminate"). 
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of revised Article 6, Chancellor William Hawkland, drew the bulk 
sale-fraudulent disposition parallel in clear terms. In the course of 
explaining the revision's limitations of actions provision, and the 
effect of the parties' failure to comply with the notice requirements 
of the statute, the Reporter observed: 
[the] limitation period is tolled if, in addition to non-compliance, 
the bulk buyer actively conceals the sale. Suit against the bulk 
buyer may be brought within one year after the sale is, or should 
have been, discovered, whichever occurs first. Also, in such a case, 
the transfer probably could be attacked as fraudulent. 1110 
That comment did not survive in the final form of the revision, but 
the noncompliance/concealment issue will still arise under Alterna-
tive B. Chancellor Hawkland could not have been suggesting that 
the noncomplying bulk sale would be avoidable as constructively 
fraudulent. That would turn on the value paid for the assets by the 
transferee. He must have been suggesting the availability of an ac-
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud action when there is 
noncompliance. Recall that an actual intent to defraud action may 
be brought notwithstanding the adequacy of the value paid by the 
transferee. So if Chancellor Hawkland was right, a noncomplying 
bulk sale may be avoidable by operation of the actual fraud provi-
sions of the fraudulent disposition law. The next section of this 
Article considers the fraudulent disposition law theories that may 
be used either to supplement bulk sales law in those states that 
opt for Alternat~ve B or provide an independent and viable basis 
for recovery in those states that opt for Alternative A, the repealer. 
III. THE BRAVE NEw WoRLD 
If either of the recently promulgated alternatives in the new 
Article 6 is adopted in the states there will, necessarily, be an ad-
justment of the expectations of commercial transactors. That will 
certainly take time. A part of that adjustment will involve the de-
velopment of offensive commercial fraud theories by counsel for 
parties who would have prevailed under original Article 6 but who 
would not have the same avoidance rights under the new regime. 
This section of the Article considers the impact of the general 
fraudulent disposition law in states which (1) repeal Article 6 (AI-
150. U.C.C. § 6-108 comment (July 31, 1987 Revised Draft). 
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ternative A), and (2) in states that adopt the revised version 
(Alternative B). 
First, however, it is worthwhile to offer a general observation 
about the bulk sales revision process. It is clear from the prefatory 
note that the drafting committee was much impressed by the argu-
ments of that portion of the commercial bar that is hostile toward 
Article 6.151 As the prefatory note makes clear, the ALI and NC-
CUSL recommend first and foremost that the states repeal Article 
6 altogether, leaving the states with no body of bulk sales law at 
all. It is not surprising, then, that Alternative B, the revised ver-
sion of Article 6, represents a compromise between those who feel 
that there should be no bulk sales law and those who believe that 
the idea of bulk sales legislation is a good one but the execution of 
the idea in the original Article 6 was deficient. The revision cuts 
back substantially on Article 6, removing from its scope many 
transactions that would be subject to regulation under the current 
law and compromising the leverage afforded unsecured trade credi-
tors of the debtor-transferor. Quite apart from whether bulk sales 
law is or is not a good thing, this section of the Article tries to 
discern what the commercial fraud landscape would look like if ei-
ther of the alternatives become law. 
A. A World Without Uniform Bulk Sales Law 
The extensive treatment of fraudulent disposition law in this 
Article, particularly with regard to its application to LBOs, is 
designed to provide the foundation for conclusions regarding the 
application of the UFCA, UFT A and Bankruptcy Code section 548 
to bulk sales if there were no uniform bulk sales legislation. 
So long as the transferee pays a fair consideration or reasona-
bly equivalent value for the assets transferred to him in bulk, a 
plaintiff unsecured creditor of the debtor-transferor will not be 
able to bring a constructive fraud action, even if the debtor is in-
solvent at the time of the sale or is rendered insolvent as a result 
of the sale. Similarly, so long as the debtor's financial condition is 
not impaired to the point of insolvency at the time of or as a result 
151. U.C.C. Article 6 prefatory note (1988) states that: "The Article ... impedes nor-
mal business transactions . . . . For this reason, Article 6 has been subjected to serious 
criticism. See, e.g., Rapson, U.C.C. Article 6: Should it be revised or 'Deep·Sixed?, 38 Bus. 
Law. 1753 (1983)." 
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of the bulk sale, the fact that the transferee did not pay a sufficient 
consideration for the assets transferred in bulk will not, standing 
alone, provide the basis of a constructive fraudulent disposition 
attack. 
It is important to recognize, however, that determinations con~ 
cerning the adequacy of consideration paid for assets and the 
financial viability of an entity that has executed a bulk sale are 
problematic at best.152 Therefore, it may be that a substantial 
number of the cases that are now brought under Article 6 would 
provide the stuff of viable constructive fraudulent disposition 
claims under the uniform state or federal bankruptcy law. Cer~ 
tainly there has been an increased interest in the application of the 
fraudulent disposition law to new contexts over the last few 
years.153 
Perhaps more troublesome for those concerned with the per~ 
sistence of bulk sales attacks after repeal of Article 6 is the scope 
of the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud basis of a fraudu~ 
lent disposition action. While the primary object of the debtor~ 
transferor and transferee may not be to prejudice the interests of 
the debtor's unsecured trade creditors, cases such as Tabor Court 
Realty make clear that intent may not be difficult to infer, particu-
larly if the trier of fact is looking for a way to redress what it 
perceives as an inequity. Further, the indicia of intent catalogued 
in section 4(b) of the UFTA, as suggested above,164 provide ample 
basis to void a oulk sale as an actually fraudulent disposition. 
152. See, e.g., Alces & Dorr, supra note 11, at 542-44; Blumberg, Intragroup (Up· 
stream, Cross-Stream, and Downstream) Guaranties Under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 685, 708-09 (1987) (discussing the various measures of 
"insolvency" in the UFCA, UFT A, and the Bankruptcy Code). 
153. See, e.g., Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re 
Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Cosoff v. Rodman (In 
re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Rubin v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as 
Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933 
(1985); Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property 
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C.L. REV. 257 (1985); Walls, Promises to 
Keep: Intercorporate Guaranties and Fraudulent Transfers in Bankruptcy, 19 U.C.C. L.J . 
219 (1987). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 138-141. 
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Finally, to add insult to injury, avoidance of a bulk sale on the 
basis of actual intent to defraud may be even more inimical to the 
interests of the transferee than avoidance under original Article 6. 
Under the bulk sales law presently in force in the states, only cred-
itors with claims against the debtor at the time of the bulk sale 
have standing to avoid the sale. UIG Section 4 of the UFT A provides 
that both those creditors with claims existing at the time of the 
fraudulent disposition as well as those whose claims arise after the 
disposition may set aside a transfer of assets if the transfer \Vas 
effected with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.11~6 Fur-
ther, section 4 of the UFTA, as well as the parallel provisions of 
the UFCA and Bankruptcy Code section 548,167 provide that "fu-
ture creditors," those whose claims arose after the disposition, may 
avoid the sale if the transferor made the transfer: 
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer . . . and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a trans-
action for which the remaining assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability 
to pay as they became due. 1~8 
It is likely that the subsection (2)(i) alternative, inadequacy of re-
maining assets, would be pertinent in the aftermath of a bulk sale. 
If that is the case, and plaintiff's counsel utilizes that fraudulent 
disposition theory, transferees may have more to fear in a world 
without Article 6 than they would if original Article 6 remains in 
force. 
B. A World With Revised Article 6 
Though the revision would adjust substantially the bulk sales 
status quo, the remarks in this section of the Article will focus on 
155. A bulk sale "is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless ... the 
transferee gives notice." U.C.C. § 6-105 (1987).. Creditors referred to in Article 6 ''nrc those 
holding claims based on transactions or events occurring before the bulk transfer.'' ld. § 6-
109. See P. AI.cES, supra note 156. · 
156. U.F.T.A § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984) 
157. Id.; U.F.C.A. §§ 5-7, 7A U.L.A. 504, 507, 509 (1918); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). 
158. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1984). 
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two particular innovations of the proposal that are designed to ad-
dress perceived shortcomings in the original version: (1) the 
exception from the scope of the law for those who make a good 
faith, though deficient, effort to comply with the law, I Go and (2) 
provision of an in personam rather than in rem right to avoid ap-
plication of the Moore v. Bay rule.160 
Section 6-107 of Alternative B determines the transferee's lia-
bility for failing to comply with notice provisions. This liability is 
the focus of this section of the Article. With regard to the good 
faith defense to an action against the bulk transferee, section 6-107 
provides: 
(3) A buyer who: 
(a) made a good faith and commercially reasonable effort to 
comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1)161 or to exclude 
159. U.C.C. § 6-107(3)(a) (1988). 
160. Id. §§ 6-107(1), (8). Subsection (8) expressly provides that: 
A buyer's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1) does not (i) 
impair the buyer's rights in or title to the assets, (ii) render the sale ineffective, void, 
or voidable, (iii) entitle a creditor to more than a single satisfaction of his [or her] 
claim, or (iv) create liability other than as provided in this Article. 
Id. § 6-107(8). 
161. Revised section 6-104(1) provides: 
(1) In a bulk sale as defined in Section 6-102(l)(c)(ii) the buyer shall: 
(a) obtain from the seller a list of all business names and addresses used 
by the seller within three years before the date the list is sent or delivered to 
the buyer; 
(b) unless excused under subsection (2), obtain from the seller a verified 
and dated list of claimants of whom the seller has notice three days before the 
seller sends or delivers the list to the buyer and including, to the extent known 
by the seller, the address of and the amount claimed by each claimant; 
(c) obtain from the seller or prepare a schedule of distribution (Section 6· 
106(1)); 
(d) give notice of the bulk sale in accordance with Section 6-105; 
(e) unless excused under Section 6-106(4), distribute the net contract price 
in accordance with the undertakings of the buyer in the schedule of distribu-
tion; and 
(0 unless excused under subsection (2), make available the list of claim-
ants (subsection (1)(b)) by: 
(i) promptly sending or delivering a copy of the list without charge to any 
claimant whose written request is received by the buyer no later than six 
months after the date of the bulk sale; 
(ii) permitting any claimant to inspect and copy the list at any reasonable 
hour upon request received by the buyer no later than six months after the 
date of the bulk sale; or 
(iii) tiling a copy of the list in the office of the [Secretary of State] no later 
than the time for giving a notice of the bulk sale (Section 6-105(5)). A list tiled 
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the sale from the application of this Article under Section 6-
103(3)162 or 
(b) on m; after the date of the bulk-sale agreement, but before 
the date of the bulk sale, held a good faith and commercially reason-
able belief that this Article does not apply to the particular sale is 
not liable to creditors for failure to comply with the requirements of 
Section 6-104. The buyer has the burden of establishing the good 
faith and commercial reasonableness of the effort or belief.163 
That savings pr.ovision appears extreme. From the perspective of 
some, it may render bulk sales law impotent. The revised Article 6 
would provide a remedy only where the plaintiff can overcome the 
assertion of the good faith defense, which, as a practical matter, 
will require the plaintiff to show a bad faith or commercially un-
reasonable failure to comply on the part of the buyer. 
Given the identity between the bases of a bulk sales action 
under the revision and an actual intent to defraud action under the 
UFTA, UFCA, or Bankruptcy Code, it is not immediately clear 
why a plaintiff would proceed under revised Article 6 rather than 
under fraudulent disposition law. Add to that the fact that more 
plaintiffs can recover under fraudulent disposition law, and it 
seems that the revision would quickly be a dead letter, no more 
efficacious than repeal of all bulk sales law. 
Further, the provision of an in personam rather than in rem 
remedy in the revision makes it even more difficult to imagine why 
a plaintiff would use revised Article 6 instead of fraudulent dispo-
sition law. The rule of Moore v. Bay provides that a trustee in 
bankruptcy avoiding a transfer pursuant to section 544(b) of the 
in accordance with this subparagraph must state the individual, partnership, or 
corporate name and a mailing address of the seller. 
Id. § 6-104(1). 
I d. 
162. U.C.C. § 6-103(3) (1988) provides: 
(3) This Article does not apply to: 
(a) a transfer made to secure payment or performance of an obligation; 
(b) a transfer of collateral to a secured party pursuant to Section 9-503; 
(c) a sale of collateral pursuant to Section 9-504; 
(d) retention of collateral pursuant to Section 9-505; 
(e) a sale of an asset encumbered by a. security interest or lien if (i) all the pro-
ceeds of the sale are applied in partial or total satisfaction of the debt secured by the 
security interest or lien or (ii) the security interest or lien is enforceable against the 
asset after it has been sold to the buyer and the net contract price is zero. 
163. Id. § 6-107(3). 
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Code, the so-called "strong-arm provision," may prosecute the 
claim of an existing creditor of the debtor without being limited in 
the amount of recovery to the amount of that particular creditor's 
claim against the debtor.164 If the trustee succeeds to the rights of 
a creditor holding an in rem claim against the debtor, such as the 
claim of a creditor with standing to avoid a bulk sale under origi-
nal Article 6 or a fraudulent disposition under the UFT A or 
UFCA, the trustee may recover all of the assets transferred. That 
can result in the transferee's being left with a claim in bankruptcy 
for the value paid for the assets and having to return the assets to 
the trustee for liquidation and pro rata distribution to all those 
holding claims against the bankruptcy estate. 
In order to avoid the bankruptcy trustee's imposition of that 
pervasive section 544(b) right, the drafters of Alternative B have 
replaced the in rem right provided under original Article 6 with an 
in personam right. 166 While the in personam remedy derives from 
section 6-107 generally, subsection (8) makes clear the drafter's 
intention: 
(8) A buyer's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 
6-104(1) does not (i) impair the buyer's rights in or title to the as-
sets, (ii) render the sale ineffective, void, or voidable, (iii) entitle a 
creditor to more than a single satisfaction of his [or her] claim, or 
(iv) create liability other than as provided in this Article.166 
Insofar as the revision would deny the trustee an in rem remedy in 
precisely those circumstances in which the trustee may have an in 
rem right under fraudulent disposition law, it is not clear why the 
trustee would pursue the Article 6 remedy if he can recover more 
using the UFCA, UFT A, or section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
While the provision of an in personam rather than an in rem rem-
edy may be an improvement in the law, insofar as it avoids the 
Moore v. Bay incongruity/57 it is not likely to be very effective in 
light of the fact that the trustee can still utilize the in rem remedy 
164. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931). 
165. U.C.C. § 6-107 & comment 2 (1988). 
166. Id. § 6-107(8). 
167. Professor Kennedy has criticized Moore v. Bay and urged that the doctrine not 
be extended. See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1419, 1422 (1967), discussed in Alces, 
Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy: Rights of the Affected Mortgagee, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 656, 
672 (1983). 
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and its Moore v. Bay corollary by prosecuting an action under 
fraudulent disposition law rather than under revised Article 6. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
This Article has described the parallels between bulk sales 
principles and general fraudulent disposition principles. It has ar-
gued not for or against either of the alternatives promulgated by 
the ALI and NCCUSL. Instead, it has suggested how the commer-
cial fraud jurisprudence might adjust to fill in any crevices created 
in the law by the abrogation of original Article 6 in whole or in 
part. 
Given the fundamental affinity between bulk sales law and 
fraudulent disposition law, it is likely that a commercial legislation 
landscape devoid of bulk sales law or with only an emasculated 
form of bulk sales law would invite creative interposition of general 
fraudulent disposition principles into transactions heretofore con-
sidered the province only of bulk sales law. Given the malleable 
nature of fraud law, it would not be surprising if it were construed 
in ways to fill any apparent legislative vacuum. Experience with 
LBOs has demonstrated how principles gleaned from the Statute 
of 13 Elizabeth, a sixteenth century enactment, may be used to 
frustrate the expectations of those involved in the most sophisti-
cated twentieth century transactions. The property interests 
vindicated by the application of fraudulent disposition law to 
LBOs are sufficiently similar to those treated by the bulk sales law 
to justify application of the same commercial fraud principles. Leg-
islators must take into account the LBO experience in deciding 
upon the efficacy of the repeal or enactment of the revised version 
of Article 6. 
The source of the jurisprudential conundrum posited in this 
Article is the promulgation of piecemeal legislation designed to re-
spond to, rather than reevaluate and inform, the development of 
commercial practices. The alternatives are not unique in their 
shortsightedness.168 This Article, then, must conclude by urging a 
168. The courts have struggled with the application and in~rprctation of the UFCA. 
It was in response to these problems that the UFI'A was draf~d. Drafters of the law 
adop~d other provisions from the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Reform Act. of 1978. For a 
discussion of the dangers attending such patchwork legislation, see Alces & Dorr, supra note 
11, at 535-37, 547. 
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comprehensive reevaluation of commercial fraud principles. Such 
an ambitious undertaking will reveal the incongruities of the cur-
rent fraudulent disposition and bulk sales law and provide a 
foundation for the development of coherent commercial fraud 
legislation. 
